Promise Public Schools, Inc. v. San Jose Unified School District
- Charles Breyer
- 3:20-cv-08555
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 19
In Promise Public Schools v. San Jose Unified School District, Judge Breyer granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Promise Public Schools, Inc.’s Section 1983 equal-protection and due-process claims were dismissed with leave to amend, while its California-law claims remained pending. The order affected the San Jose Unified School District, Nancy Albarran, Stephen McMahon, and the other named defendants.
What happened
Promise Public Schools, Inc. sued the San Jose Unified School District, Nancy Albarran, Stephen McMahon, and others. Promise alleged that the defendants violated its constitutional rights and California law while it sought facilities for a charter school.
The court dismissed Promise’s constitutional claims under Section 1983, allowing Promise to amend them. The court denied the motion to dismiss Promise’s California-law claims, so those claims were not dismissed at this stage.
Judge Breyer ruled that Promise had not alleged enough detail to support its equal-protection and due-process claims, but it may file another amended complaint within 30 days.
The detailed version
- Promise Public Schools, Inc. v. San Jose Unified School District · No. 3:20-cv-08555
- Charles Breyer
- Mar. 10, 2021
Background
Promise Public Schools, Inc. sued the San Jose Unified School District (SJUSD), Superintendent Nancy Albarran, Deputy Superintendent Stephen McMahon, and various Doe defendants. Promise alleged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, and several violations of California law.
The dispute concerned California’s Proposition 39 facilities process for charter schools. Promise alleged that SJUSD used unusually strict methods to evaluate its projected enrollment, denied or delayed access to facilities, and imposed requirements during negotiations over a facilities-use agreement. Promise also alleged that Albarran and McMahon acted with personal and anti-charter animus.
Promise asserted two constitutional claims against Albarran and McMahon in their individual capacities: an equal-protection claim based on being treated differently from similarly situated charter schools, and a due-process claim based on the alleged loss of its charter-related and facilities-related interests. Its state-law claims included promissory fraud, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of statutory duty, and tortious interference with contract.
Court’s analysis
Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). At this stage, the court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asked whether the complaint alleged a legally plausible claim. The court rejected defendants’ argument that Promise lacked standing to bring its constitutional claims against Albarran and McMahon individually. The court therefore considered the substance of those pleaded claims, while still applying the pleading standard for a motion to dismiss.
For the equal-protection claim, Promise relied on a “class of one” theory. That theory requires allegations that the defendants intentionally treated the plaintiff differently from similarly situated entities without a rational basis. The court held that Promise had not identified a specific similarly situated charter school that received different treatment. Its allegations about the enrollment forms, heightened scrutiny of its facilities requests, and the deadline for completing the facilities-use agreement were too general. The court also found that some of the challenged decisions involved discretionary judgments that were not readily comparable across schools. Finally, the allegations of personal animus were conclusory and did not explain why the defendants allegedly treated Promise more harshly than other charter schools.
For the due-process claim, Promise alleged protected interests in operating its charter school and using SJUSD facilities. The court held that Albarran and McMahon could not have deprived Promise of its charter because the State Board of Education held the authority to revoke or renew it. The court also concluded that Promise had not adequately alleged that its agreement concerning SJUSD facilities created the kind of constitutionally protected property interest recognized under the Due Process Clause. In addition, Promise did not specify what additional process Albarran and McMahon should have provided in their individual capacities beyond the remedies available under California law.
The court did not dismiss the California-law claims. It denied the motion to dismiss to the extent defendants sought dismissal of those claims.
Disposition
The court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. It granted the motion to dismiss Promise’s Section 1983 equal-protection and due-process claims, with leave to amend. It denied the motion to dismiss Promise’s state-law claims. Promise could file another amended complaint addressing its Section 1983 claims within 30 days of the order. Judge Charles R. Breyer signed the order on March 10, 2021.
Read the full 19-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.