Caldwell v. City of San Francisco

Background and trial procedures

After the first pretrial conference on March 4, 2021, the court issued Pretrial Order No. 1. Assuming civil jury trials had reopened and no other trial had priority, jury selection would begin on April 29 or May 3, 2021, with trial beginning no sooner than May 3. The jury schedule was set for Monday through Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m., and the parties’ total trial time was limited to 75 hours: 45 hours for Caldwell and 30 hours for the defendants. The court also addressed pretrial conferences, jury questionnaires, objections, witnesses, exhibits, deposition transcripts, video depositions, opening demonstratives, settlement notices, and compliance with court orders.

The court denied Defendants’ motion to bifurcate the trial between liability and damages. The court nevertheless ordered that liability for punitive damages and the amount of punitive damages would be tried separately. The parties were required to submit a joint sworn summary of Crenshaw’s financial condition in a sealed envelope for possible use if the jury found liability for punitive damages.

Rulings on motions in limine

A motion in limine is a request to decide before trial whether particular evidence or arguments may be presented to the jury.

• Plaintiff’s motion concerning references to Caldwell’s alleged guilt or innocence was denied in part and granted in part. Lawyers and witnesses may not say that Caldwell was found guilty, not guilty, or innocent. The court denied the request for a presumption-of-innocence instruction because this is a civil trial, while stating that it would consider a renewed request if circumstances during trial warranted one.

• Caldwell’s motion concerning his decision not to testify at the Acosta criminal trial was granted. No party may argue about, or elicit testimony concerning, speculation about that decision.

• Caldwell’s motion concerning the criminal-trial jury verdict and court rulings was granted as to a specific example involving Cummins’s anticipated rebuttal testimony and otherwise denied as overbroad. The court also required advance notice before parties refer to materials from the Acosta proceedings so that it could consider limiting instructions.

• Caldwell’s motion concerning whether Crenshaw’s allegedly fabricated report was used during the Acosta proceedings was denied. The court found that evidence about whether the report was used at different stages could be relevant to causation—the required connection between the alleged conduct and Caldwell’s injury.

• Caldwell’s motion to present Funches’s testimony by live video was granted in part. The court allowed the possibility of testimony about physical evidence at the crime scene, subject to a limiting instruction, but withheld its ruling on proposed testimony about who shot Acosta until Caldwell provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation.

• Defendants’ motion concerning Cobbs’s prior testimony was denied as overbroad. Specific portions of that testimony required at least one court day’s advance notice.

• Defendants’ motion concerning expert testimony by Klee, Kaneb, and Tuttle was granted as moot as to Klee, granted as to Kaneb, and granted as to Tuttle in his capacity as a treating-physician expert. Tuttle could testify as a lay witness because he had been disclosed as a percipient witness. Defendants’ separate motion concerning Tuttle was denied.

• Caldwell’s motion seeking to preclude a prosecutorial-independent-judgment defense and defendants’ motion seeking to exclude evidence of damages after charging were denied. The court held that both were improper summary-judgment motions filed without permission and also explained that causation remained for the jury. The parties and witnesses were prohibited from using the phrase “prosecutorial independent judgment” or a variation of it because the phrase was a legal conclusion.

• Caldwell’s motion concerning Giannini’s testimony was granted in part and denied in part. Giannini could testify about information he received and reviewed, his interactions with investigators and others, and his own actions and observations. He could not testify about the credibility or reliability of other witnesses or evidence. Other categories concerning Cobbs’s religious practices, Cobbs’s trial testimony, and possible perjury prosecution were excluded or treated as moot, while testimony about Giannini’s visit to the Alemany Projects was permitted.

• Defendants’ motion concerning Caldwell’s expert Brass was granted in part. Brass could testify about the standard of care and what a reasonable prosecutor might do when evaluating evidence, but could not testify about Giannini’s conduct, whether Giannini met the standard of care, the credibility or reliability of evidence or witnesses, or whether probable cause existed to charge Caldwell.

• Caldwell’s motion concerning defendants’ expert Cummins was granted in part and denied in part. The court denied the motion insofar as Cummins’s opinions were proper rebuttal testimony, but barred opinion 9 because it did not rebut another expert’s opinion. The court imposed the same general limits on Cummins’s remaining opinions that it imposed on Brass’s testimony.

• Caldwell’s motion concerning Gerrans, Crowley, and Giannini testifying as non-retained experts was granted in part and denied in part. They could testify as percipient witnesses about their own experiences and actions, but they could not offer expert opinions about ultimate causation issues or the credibility of other witnesses.

• Defendants’ motion concerning evidence about Gerrans’s and Crowley’s investigation was denied. The court found that evidence about their investigative actions was relevant to Caldwell’s causation theory. Defendants’ motion concerning probable cause to refer the investigation for prosecution was granted as unopposed to the extent it addressed probable cause, but denied as to evidence concerning the lineups.

• Defendants’ motion concerning whether the lineups were unduly suggestive was granted to the extent Caldwell could not argue that the lineups violated his constitutional rights, because the Ninth Circuit had already decided that issue. Evidence about alleged investigative deficiencies remained potentially admissible for causation, subject to a limiting instruction.

• Defendants’ motion concerning dismissed claims was granted as unopposed to the extent that no party or witness could refer to the fact that Caldwell had brought claims against Gerrans and Crowley or that those claims had been dismissed. Evidence about alleged investigative deficiencies remained potentially admissible for causation.

• Defendants’ motion concerning Caldwell’s expert Fischer was granted in part, denied in part, and held in abeyance in part. Fischer could not testify that factors showed Caldwell’s alleged statement was not credible. Other identified opinions about the investigation were allowed, and rulings on opinions 12 and 13 were deferred. Defendants’ request to bar Fischer from testifying about three files produced late was denied.

• Caldwell’s motion concerning expert J. Berg was granted as to an undisclosed opinion that Caldwell had antisocial personality disorder before his incarceration in Acosta. The motion concerning juvenile records was granted in part and denied in part: J. Berg could not testify about the facts underlying Caldwell’s juvenile convictions, but could refer to the fact and length of his juvenile incarcerations for a limited purpose. The motion concerning the Steward report was granted in part and denied in part, allowing limited testimony about Caldwell’s mental status, mood, and a prior diagnosis while excluding other portions. The motion concerning prison disciplinary and parole records was granted. The motion concerning a post-incarceration arrest was granted in part and denied in part, allowing testimony that Caldwell chose to spend extra nights in jail but generally barring testimony about the reasons for the arrest. The motion concerning marijuana use was granted as moot.

• Defendants’ motion to strike P. Berg’s rebuttal report was denied.

• Defendants’ motion concerning Abramson’s testimony was granted as to proposed testimony about prison conditions, legal opinions in Brown v. Plata, unidentified photographs of dead individuals in prison, an opinion that Crenshaw fabricated evidence, and Abramson’s personal opinion that Caldwell was innocent. Abramson could testify that his analysis assumed Caldwell was innocent but could not express a personal belief that Caldwell was innocent.

• Defendants’ motion concerning questioning J. Berg about a mental examination in Trulove was granted.

• Defendants’ motions concerning Buckley’s testimony were granted as to proposed testimony about Caldwell’s psychological injuries, physical injuries in prison, character, and psychological damage to corrections officers. Defendants’ separate motion concerning physical-injury evidence was granted in part. Caldwell could testify about the fact and effects of his back injury because that evidence was relevant to economic damages, but the order states that he had dropped his claim for damages for physical injuries while retaining a claim for psychological injury resulting from physical injury.

• The final portion of the supplied text states that requests concerning Stauss’s testimony about Caldwell’s psychological or physical injuries, character, and rehabilitative opportunities were granted. It also states that testimony about whether Caldwell could have lowered his classification score was relevant but potentially confusing, speculative, prejudicial, and likely to cause delay; the parties were ordered to propose a plan for presenting it. The supplied excerpt cuts off part of the exact ruling about the scope of testimony concerning rehabilitative opportunities.

Disposition and effect

This was a pretrial evidentiary and case-management order. It set trial procedures and resolved or deferred motions about what the jury could hear and how witnesses could testify. It did not enter a final verdict on liability or damages. The court warned that failure to comply with its orders could result in sanctions, including monetary fines or terminating sanctions.