Quigley v. United Airlines, Inc.

Background

Michael Quigley alleged that United Airlines terminated him after he took medical leave related to bipolar disorder. He claimed that United made errors in paperwork for his disability leave, causing him to lose disability benefits and health insurance; that employees continued contacting him about a meeting and medical documentation while he was ill; and that he was disciplined and terminated in November 2019. He also alleged that United scheduled younger flight attendants for more flights and reserve duty, although he did not allege that this scheduling practice affected him.

Quigley asserted twelve causes of action under California law, including age and disability discrimination, hostile-work-environment harassment, retaliation, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to prevent discrimination and harassment, express and implied contract claims, negligent hiring or supervision or retention, wrongful termination, whistleblower retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The opinion states that the disability-accommodation and interactive-process claims were not challenged in the motion. United and Elizabeth Jacobsen, the manager alleged to have sent Quigley his termination letter, moved to dismiss most of the other claims.

Removal jurisdiction and Jacobsen

The court first determined that it had diversity jurisdiction. Quigley's lawyer acknowledged that Quigley was domiciled in Florida, while Jacobsen was a California citizen. The court nevertheless disregarded Jacobsen's citizenship after finding that she had been fraudulently joined. Fraudulent joinder means adding a nondiverse defendant against whom there is no possible viable claim in the circumstances presented.

The complaint mentioned Jacobsen only once, alleging that she sent Quigley's termination letter. Quigley asserted hostile-work-environment harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against her. The court held that termination alone, without discriminatory, harassing, rude, or otherwise aggravating conduct, could not support either claim under California law. It therefore dismissed the claims against Jacobsen with prejudice and dismissed her from the case with prejudice.

Railway Labor Act preemption

The Railway Labor Act requires disputes that depend on the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement to proceed through the agreement's grievance and arbitration procedures rather than ordinary court litigation. The court explained that state-law claims based on rights independent of the collective bargaining agreement are not preempted merely because they refer to, or are factually related to, the agreement.

The court held that Quigley's express and implied contract claims were preempted. Both claims were based on an alleged agreement that United could terminate Quigley only for good cause. Determining whether such an agreement existed or was breached would substantially depend on the collective bargaining agreement and other employment documents. The court dismissed claims seven and eight with prejudice as preempted by the Railway Labor Act.

The court did not find the discrimination, harassment, negligent-supervision, retaliation, whistleblower-retaliation, or intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims preempted on the record before it. It stated that United had not identified a contested collective bargaining agreement provision whose interpretation was required. The court noted that United could renew a preemption argument against an amended complaint if appropriate.

Failure to state a claim

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain enough factual allegations to make the claimed entitlement to relief plausible, rather than merely possible. The court held that several claims consisted largely of legal conclusions or did not connect the alleged conduct to a legally recognized claim.

For age discrimination, Quigley alleged that he was over 40 and was terminated, but he did not allege facts plausibly connecting his termination to age discrimination. The scheduling practices involving younger flight attendants allegedly did not affect him. The court dismissed claim one with leave to amend and stated that any amended discrimination claim should clearly identify the protected basis being pursued.

For hostile-work-environment harassment, the court held that the alleged calls about a meeting, requests for medical documentation, paperwork errors, discipline, termination, and other managerial actions did not plausibly show repeated or pervasive harassment or a widespread pattern of age- or disability-based bias. It dismissed claim two with leave to amend.

The negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claim was inadequately pleaded because the complaint did not identify the employee who was allegedly negligently hired, supervised, or retained or provide the basic facts supporting the theory. The theory explained in Quigley's brief—that United negligently retained Smith after his paperwork errors and meeting-related conduct—did not show that United knew or should have known Smith was unfit or likely to cause the alleged harm. The court dismissed claim nine with leave to amend.

The court considered Quigley's California whistleblower-retaliation claim based on his report to Obrien about Smith's allegedly incorrect paperwork. It held that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Quigley reported suspected illegal activity or that the report caused his termination. The court dismissed claim eleven with leave to amend. The court did not decide whether the separate FEHA retaliation claim was adequately pleaded because United had not challenged it on that ground.

For intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court held that the alleged conduct—including termination, attempts to reschedule a meeting, and paperwork errors—was not sufficiently extreme or outrageous under California law. It dismissed claim twelve with leave to amend. The court also noted that United had raised another possible bar based on California's workplace-compensation framework but did not decide that issue.

Disposition

The court's conclusion was: the claims against Jacobsen were dismissed with prejudice; claims seven and eight were dismissed with prejudice as preempted by the Railway Labor Act; and claims one, two, nine, eleven, and twelve were dismissed with leave to amend. Any amended complaint had to be filed within 20 days. The opinion does not state that claims three, four, five, or six were dismissed in this order, although it explains that claims four and five were not challenged and United did not challenge claim six under Rule 12(b)(6).