Buckins v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

Darrell Buckins brought claims under Section 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, against San Francisco County Sheriff’s personnel and the City and County of San Francisco. He alleged unconstitutional punishment, excessive force, deliberate indifference to medical risks, retaliation for filing grievances, and related state-law violations. He was a pretrial detainee at San Francisco County Jail during the events described.

Buckins had suffered serious leg, back, and neck injuries in a 2015 automobile accident and had used a wheelchair, walker, and cane. The opinion described two principal incidents. On August 31, 2018, Deputy Chito Villanueva dragged Buckins toward a transport vehicle, and Buckins later alleged that Captain Kevin McConnell, Villanueva, and Deputy James Sharpe forced him into a holding tank, where Sharpe punched him and pushed his head against a wall. On November 6, 2018, during a jail cell search, Deputy Ruben Sanchez and other deputies allegedly handcuffed, struck, kicked, and restrained Buckins in the gym and interview room, then forced him into a painful position. Buckins also alleged that the August transfer and assaults were retaliation for grievances about raw sewage at the jail.

Summary-judgment standard and constitutional claims

The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could find for the opposing party. The court was required to view disputed evidence in Buckins’s favor at this stage, but emphasized that it was not finding that his account was true.

For excessive-force claims by a pretrial detainee, the question was whether the force was objectively unreasonable, considering factors such as the need for force, the amount used, the security problem, the perceived threat, and whether Buckins resisted.

The court ruled as follows on the Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claims:

- The claim concerning Villanueva dragging Buckins to the transport bus and requiring him to board was dismissed. The court found that the force shown by the video and testimony served the valid purpose of moving Buckins for transport and did not appear objectively unreasonable. - Summary judgment was denied on the August holding-tank assault claim against Sharpe and Villanueva. The court found that a jury could view Sharpe’s punching and pushing as punishment after Buckins had complied, and that Villanueva could be liable for failing to intervene. - Summary judgment was denied on the November gym assault claim, to the extent stated in the order. The court found that a jury could credit Buckins’s testimony that Sanchez and Kaiwi punched, kicked, and painfully manipulated him without resistance or a security justification. Espinoza and Paul could also remain defendants based on their alleged failure to intervene during the assault. - Summary judgment was denied on the November interview-room assault claim. The court found sufficient evidence for a jury to consider whether Kaiwi, Espinoza, and Paul participated in or facilitated the punches, kicks, painful leg bends, removal of Buckins’s pants, and other conduct.

The court also addressed deliberate-indifference claims. Deliberate indifference in this context required a substantial risk of serious harm and an objectively unreasonable failure to respond. The court granted the motion on the August dragging claim because the record did not show that Villanueva knew about Buckins’s disability or acted with deliberate indifference. It granted the motion on the August bus-stairs claim because, although a jury could find that requiring Buckins to descend without the railing created a serious risk of harm, qualified immunity protected the defendants: the law did not clearly establish that requiring him to walk down the stairs was unlawful.

The court denied summary judgment on the August holding-tank claim concerning forced kneeling, finding that a jury could conclude that Sharpe and Villanueva disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm and that qualified immunity did not bar the claim. It also denied summary judgment on the November interview-room stress-position claim, finding that the evidence could support a conclusion that forcing Buckins to remain on his stomach for thirty minutes after the alleged assault was punitive and deliberately indifferent. The court granted the motion on the November forced-walking claim because, although factual disputes prevented summary judgment on whether a constitutional violation occurred, Buckins did not identify clearly established law making that conduct unlawful. It granted the motion on the November Pod 2A claim because Buckins could not identify a named defendant as one of the assailants.

Other claims

The court granted the motion on Buckins’s Americans with Disabilities Act claims. It held that individual deputies were not public entities for purposes of Title II and concluded that the record did not show that officers knew of Buckins’s disability or deliberately disregarded it. The court noted that Buckins did not defend those claims in his opposition, although he did not expressly waive them.

The court denied summary judgment on Buckins’s First Amendment retaliation claim against McConnell, Villanueva, and Sharpe. It found that the timing of Buckins’s grievance and transfer, McConnell’s statements about complaints, and the assault that followed could support a finding that the defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances. The court also concluded that qualified immunity did not protect the defendants on this claim.

The court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. It held that the California Tort Claims Act barred the negligence claim arising from the August 2018 incident because the required claim had not been properly presented for that incident. It nevertheless denied summary judgment on the negligence claims corresponding to the surviving federal claims. It denied summary judgment on the November battery claim against Sanchez and Kaiwi for the gym assault and against Kaiwi, Paul, and Espinoza for the interview-room incident. It also denied summary judgment on the Bane Act claim against Sanchez for the gym incident and against Kaiwi, Espinoza, and Paul for the interview-room assault.

Disposition

The order states that Sharpe, Kaiwi, Espinoza, Villanueva, Sanchez, McConnell, and Paul were the remaining defendants and that each remaining claim survived only to the extent described in the order. The motion for summary judgment was GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The court stated that the surviving claims would proceed to trial, where a jury would decide what happened.