Clark v. Westbrae Natural, Inc.

Background

Howard Clark challenged Westbrae Natural, Inc.’s labeling of a soymilk product as “Vanilla.” Clark alleged that he relied on that word when buying the product and believed its vanilla flavor came exclusively from the vanilla plant. He alleged that testing identified flavor compounds including vanillin and maltol, which he described as flavoring agents used to simulate, resemble, or reinforce vanilla flavor. He also alleged that he would not have bought the product, or would not have paid a premium price, had he known the source of the flavor.

Clark asserted claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), California’s false-advertising law, and the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). His UCL claim included unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent theories. The court had previously granted Westbrae’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. Clark then filed a Second Amended Complaint, and Westbrae moved to dismiss it again.

Reasonable-consumer claims

The court applied the reasonable-consumer standard to Clark’s false-advertising claims under the UCL, the CLRA, and California’s false-advertising law. Under that standard, a plaintiff must plausibly show that consumers are likely to be deceived by the challenged statements.

The court held that Clark had not plausibly alleged that a reasonable consumer would understand the unqualified word “Vanilla” to mean that the product’s flavor came exclusively from vanilla beans. It reasoned that “vanilla” commonly functions as a flavor description rather than an ingredient claim. The label did not include wording such as “Made with Aged Vanilla,” or images of a vanilla plant or bean, that might support the interpretation Clark urged.

The court also rejected reliance on Clark’s survey. The survey showed respondents a picture of the product and asked what “Vanilla” conveyed about the origin of the flavor. The court agreed with other courts that the survey was flawed because it assumed the label conveyed something about the flavor’s origin and did not allow respondents to say that the label conveyed nothing about origin. The court further concluded that, even without those flaws, the survey did not overcome the prevailing reasonable understanding of “vanilla” or make consumer deception plausible.

The court found Clark’s reliance on a case involving the phrase “krab mix” unpersuasive. It explained that the other case involved a term without a commonly understood contrary meaning, while Clark argued that “Vanilla” meant the flavor was derived exclusively from vanilla beans. The court considered that interpretation too far a reach. The court also rejected allegations comparing Westbrae’s product with a competing product, finding no allegation that consumers knew the competing product used vanilla flavor exclusively from the vanilla plant or would make the same assumption about Westbrae’s product.

Accordingly, the court held that Clark had not plausibly alleged that a reasonable consumer would expect a product labeled “vanilla” to derive its flavor exclusively from vanilla beans. It dismissed all of his deception claims, identified in the order as claims 2 through 4.

UCL unlawful-prong claim

Clark also alleged that Westbrae violated the UCL’s unlawful prong based on alleged violations of federal food-labeling regulations and the Sherman Act. Because the court dismissed the related false-advertising claims, those claims could not serve as the basis for the UCL unlawful claim.

The court separately considered Clark’s allegations under 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(i)(1), a federal regulation governing labeling of spices, flavorings, colorings, and preservatives. The court explained that the regulation permits a product to be labeled as “vanilla” if it contains no artificial ingredient that simulates, resembles, or reinforces the vanilla flavor, subject to specified exceptions.

The court found that Clark had not plausibly alleged that vanillin and maltol in the product were artificial flavors. It noted that Clark had withdrawn or declined to support that allegation and had conceded at oral argument that vanillin can be derived from the vanilla bean. The court also rejected Clark’s alternative theories under subsections (i)(1)(ii) and (i)(1)(iii), concluding that he had not plausibly alleged that the product lacked enough vanilla to independently characterize its vanilla flavor. The court therefore held that Clark had not plausibly alleged a violation of the federal labeling regulation.

The court likewise rejected Clark’s Sherman Act theory because the provisions he cited were based on the same false-advertising allegations that failed under the reasonable-consumer standard. It held that Clark had failed to state a UCL unlawful-prong claim based on either the federal regulations or the Sherman Act.

Disposition

Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granted Westbrae’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend because it found further amendment would be futile after Clark had filed three complaints in the lawsuit. The court did not address Westbrae’s arguments concerning preemption, standing to seek injunctive relief, or restitution. The order stated that judgment for Westbrae and against Clark would be entered in a separate order.