Raquel Chavez v. WYNAR

Background

The plaintiffs sued Roahn Wynar over events during the July 11, 2017, execution of a search warrant at the Sunnyvale office of Life Savers Concepts Association, Inc. The search involved participants from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Response Division, and the Monterey County District Attorney’s Office.

The agents detained the four occupants. Rito Chavez and Esequiel Lombera were handcuffed, while Raquel Chavez and Lupita Chavez were not. Wynar later obtained identification information from Rito, Esequiel, and Lupita and told them they were free to leave. Wynar kept questioning Raquel after the others were released. The evidence conflicted about whether Raquel agreed to the questioning or was told she had to stay, how long she remained, and whether she was prevented from contacting anyone for an extended period.

The remaining claims were damages claims against a federal official for alleged Fourth Amendment violations. They were brought under an implied remedy recognized in certain circumstances for constitutional violations by federal officials, commonly called a Bivens claim. Wynar sought summary judgment, arguing that he had not violated the plaintiffs’ rights and was protected by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity can protect a government official from civil damages when the official did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Raquel’s detention and questioning claim

The court held that genuine disputes of material fact existed about whether Raquel voluntarily agreed to further questioning or was ordered to stay and answer questions, how long she was detained after the other plaintiffs were released, and whether she was held without meaningful access to communication. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, a search-warrant detention may be reasonable during the search, but a forced interrogation and holding a detainee incommunicado may violate the Fourth Amendment.

Because those factual disputes affected both whether Wynar violated Raquel’s constitutional right and whether the right was clearly established, the court could not resolve qualified immunity at the summary-judgment stage. The court therefore denied Wynar’s motion for summary judgment on Raquel’s unreasonable-detention claim.

Lupita’s cell-phone claim

Lupita’s claim alleged that Wynar unreasonably detained her by preventing her from using her cell phone during the search-warrant detention. The court found a genuine dispute about how long she was denied phone access. It explained that phone restrictions during this type of detention must be carefully tailored to the justification for the restriction and that the applicable precedent did not establish a simple time limit.

Because the disputed duration affected both the alleged constitutional violation and qualified immunity, the court could not decide those issues on summary judgment. The court therefore denied Wynar’s motion for summary judgment on Lupita’s unreasonable-detention claim.

Rito and Esequiel’s detention claim

The court granted Wynar’s motion for summary judgment on Rito and Esequiel’s claim that they were detained for an unreasonably prolonged period. Their own testimony indicated that they were released after their identification was requested and, in Esequiel’s case, after his backpack was checked. The record showed that they were released by approximately 10:20 a.m., while the search continued until approximately 1:00 to 1:30 p.m.

Because occupants could generally be detained during a search and Rito and Esequiel were released well before the search ended, the court found Wynar’s conduct lawful under the cited precedent. It found no other evidentiary basis for concluding that their detention was unreasonable and did not reach Wynar’s alternative qualified-immunity argument.

Rito and Esequiel’s excessive-force claim

The court also granted summary judgment on Rito and Esequiel’s excessive-force claim. Although the claim was framed as involving guns pointed at them, none of the plaintiffs testified that Wynar pointed a gun at either man or ordered another agent to point one. The plaintiffs instead argued that Wynar used excessive force by handcuffing them while other agents had weapons pointed at them.

The court concluded that this conduct was lawful under Supreme Court precedent concerning handcuffing occupants at gunpoint during a search-warrant detention. It also noted that the court had previously dismissed with prejudice the substantially similar theory that Wynar’s handcuffing of Rito and Esequiel constituted excessive force. The plaintiffs also appeared to raise a new supervisory-liability theory in their opposition, but the court held that they could not add a new theory for the first time at summary judgment and, in any event, a supervisor could not be liable solely for a subordinate’s conduct.

Disposition

The court’s order granted Wynar’s motion for summary judgment as to Rito and Esequiel’s Fourth Amendment Bivens claims for excessive force and unreasonable detention. It denied the motion as to Raquel’s and Lupita’s Fourth Amendment Bivens claims for unreasonable detention.