Tamrat v. Marlowe
- Phyllis Hamilton
- 4:20-cv-07623
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 6
Tamrat v. Marlowe: Judge Hamilton dismissed Martin-related claims, denied counsel, continued claims against Marlowe and Tamayo, and granted defendants an extension.
Tamrat’s claims against physician’s assistant Martin and other dismissed parties were terminated, while his excessive-force claims against Adam Marlowe and Tamayo remained pending; his request for appointed counsel was denied, and defendants received more time to file a dispositive motion.
What happened
In Herman Tamrat v. Adam Marlowe, et al., Tamrat, a state prisoner representing himself, filed a civil-rights case under a federal law allowing suits for violations of constitutional rights. The court had already allowed excessive-force claims against Adam Marlowe and Tamayo to continue and gave Tamrat a chance to amend his other claims.
The court dismissed the claims against physician’s assistant Martin because Tamrat had not plausibly shown that Martin used unreasonable force during an examination or denied adequate medical care. Those claims were dismissed with prejudice, except for a separate medical-care claim from December 2018, which was dismissed without prejudice. The excessive-force claims against Marlowe and Tamayo continue.
Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton denied Tamrat’s request for appointed counsel because he presented his claims adequately and the issues were not complex. The court granted defendants an extension to file a dispositive motion by July 14, 2021.
The detailed version
- Tamrat v. Marlowe · No. 4:20-cv-07623
- Phyllis Hamilton
- May 13, 2021
Background
Herman Tamrat, a state prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court had ordered service on Adam Marlowe and Tamayo for an excessive-force claim and had dismissed the remaining claims and defendants with leave to amend. Tamrat filed a second amended complaint.
Tamrat alleged that Marlowe and Tamayo knocked him to the ground, painfully bent his hands, wrists, and arms, slammed him to the ground, and later shoved him into a doorframe. He also alleged that physician’s assistant Martin painfully squeezed his injured hand and wrist during an examination, ignored his requests to stop, and stopped the examination after he pushed Martin’s hand away and cried out in pain. Tamrat further alleged that Martin failed to provide adequate medical care.
Court’s analysis
The court applied the prisoner-complaint screening requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under that requirement, the court must identify claims that can proceed and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or seek money from an immune defendant.
For an excessive-force claim by a pretrial detainee, the relevant question is whether the force purposely or knowingly used was objectively unreasonable. For a pretrial detainee’s medical-care claim, the plaintiff must show, among other things, that the defendant made an intentional decision about the conditions of confinement, those conditions created a substantial risk of serious harm, and the defendant failed to take reasonable measures to address that risk. The court explained that this standard requires more than negligence but less than subjective intent.
The court concluded that Tamrat had not cured the deficiencies previously identified in his claims against Martin. He did not plausibly show that the force Martin used while examining his hand and wrist was objectively unreasonable or unrelated to the examination. He also offered only conclusory allegations that Martin denied proper medical care. The court noted that a later X-ray showed no fracture or dislocation, although a small fracture was identified and treated with a splint and anti-inflammatory medication. The court also noted that Tamrat said he prevented Martin from fully examining his hand and wrist because the examination was painful.
Rulings
The court dismissed with prejudice the claims against Martin based on excessive force and inadequate medical care because Tamrat had already been given an opportunity to amend, repeated the same allegations, and further amendment would be futile. A separate claim concerning medical care in December 2018 was dismissed without prejudice from this action, as stated in the opinion’s footnote.
The case continues on the excessive-force claims against Marlowe and Tamayo. The amended complaint is the operative complaint, and all other claims and defendants were dismissed with prejudice, subject to the opinion’s separate statement that the December 2018 medical-care claim was dismissed without prejudice.
The court denied Tamrat’s motion to appoint counsel. It found that he had presented his claims adequately and that the legal issues were not complex enough to constitute exceptional circumstances warranting a request for appointed counsel. The court granted defendants’ request for an extension and allowed them to file a dispositive motion by July 14, 2021. Other aspects of the earlier service order remained in effect.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.