Williams v. County Of Monterey

Background

The court summarized its oral rulings from the May 6, 2021, final pretrial conference on eight motions in limine. A motion in limine asks the court to decide before trial whether particular evidence or arguments may be presented to the jury. The underlying case involves the 2018 removal of minors L.S. and Q.S. from Monia Williams’s custody and plaintiffs’ civil-rights claims.

Plaintiffs’ Motions

1. Testimony about exigent circumstances and the lawfulness of removal. Plaintiffs sought to exclude defense expert and lay testimony about whether exigent circumstances existed when L.S. and Q.S. were removed. The court agreed that the motion violated its prior instruction allowing each motion in limine to challenge only one expert, but addressed the merits. It concluded that suitable expert testimony could help jurors understand reports of abuse and the removal of minors, and that testimony from defendants and others at the scene could help the jury decide whether exigency existed. The court therefore denied Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1, without prejudice to objections to particular questions or testimony at trial.

2. Criminal histories of Elijah Steen and Khalil Williams. The court found that the convictions and the Jack-in-the-Box incident were not directly relevant to the 2018 events and were inadmissible during defendants’ case-in-chief. The convictions could be used to impeach Elijah Steen and Khalil Williams if they testified, but only concerning the elements of the crimes of conviction. The convictions could not be used to impeach Monia Williams or Regina Mason because the convictions occurred after the events at issue. Evidence that Williams knew Khalil was on bail, and evidence from the Jack-in-the-Box incident, might be used to impeach Williams or L.S., depending on their testimony. The court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 2, without prejudice to objections to particular questions or testimony at trial.

3. Evidence and argument about the difficulty of child-abuse investigations and removal decisions. Plaintiffs sought to exclude evidence or argument that investigations and removal decisions are difficult for social workers and law-enforcement officers. The court found the motion too broad to apply the evidence rules meaningfully before hearing specific testimony. It stated that the jury could be educated about the defendants’ jobs and the circumstances surrounding lawful removals, but defendants could not offer evidence solely to appeal to the jury’s sympathy. The court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 3, without prejudice to objections at trial.

Defendants’ Motions

1. Witnesses and evidence not disclosed during discovery. Defendants sought to exclude four witnesses and any other witnesses or evidence that plaintiffs had not properly disclosed. The court found no basis to exclude Rinnu Chacko, Susan Gehrig, or Dr. Peter Marshall because they were not on plaintiffs’ final witness list. It also found that Mel Mason was disclosed before the close of fact discovery. The court rejected defendants’ argument that the disclosure was too late and noted that defendants could have sought additional time to depose Mason. The court denied Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 1, without prejudice to objections to particular witnesses or evidence at trial.

2. Inconsistencies between police reports and body-camera videos. Defendants sought to exclude evidence concerning alleged inconsistencies between police reports and officers’ body-camera recordings. The court found the evidence relevant to liability on the remaining claims, particularly plaintiffs’ punitive-damages claims, and concluded that its value outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice. The court denied Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 2, without prejudice to appropriate objections at trial.

3. Melinda Murphy as a rebuttal expert. Defendants sought to exclude Murphy’s testimony, arguing that her report exceeded the proper scope of rebuttal and that she was being used to prove plaintiffs’ case rather than respond to defense evidence. The court explained that plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of proving each element of their civil-rights claims, but defendants had not shown that plaintiffs must use expert testimony to meet that burden. The court ruled that Murphy could not testify in plaintiffs’ case-in-chief but could testify to rebut the opinions of defendants’ expert Heidi Staples. The court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 3, without prejudice to objections that Murphy’s testimony exceeded the scope of rebuttal.

4. Trish O’Neill as a rebuttal expert. For the reasons given regarding Murphy, the court ruled that O’Neill could not testify during plaintiffs’ case-in-chief but could offer proper rebuttal testimony. The court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 4, without prejudice to objections that O’Neill’s testimony exceeded the scope of rebuttal.

5. Damages evidence. Defendants sought to exclude special-damages evidence for failure to provide the required calculations and to exclude damages incurred after the juvenile court’s detention order. The court found that plaintiffs had satisfied their disclosure obligations through their supplemental disclosures and Dr. Caroline Mok’s expert report, so it denied the portion of the motion based on failure to disclose damages calculations. Relying on the principles discussed in Carey v. Piphus and Watson v. City of San Jose, the court ruled that plaintiffs could seek damages caused by the initial removal if they proved that it violated their constitutional rights, but could not seek damages caused by the juvenile court’s detention decision or the prolonged detention after the relevant May 14, 2018, order following contested proceedings. The court granted in part the portion of the motion seeking to exclude those damages. It declined to rule as a matter of law that damages must be cut off after the time defendants allegedly could have obtained a warrant, leaving that issue for the jury.

Disposition and Classification

The order resolved pretrial evidence motions and did not enter a final ruling on the plaintiffs’ underlying claims. Judge Beth Labson Freeman denied, granted in part, or granted in part and denied in part the motions as described above. The order also stated that several rulings were without prejudice to objections at trial.