Khouanmany v. Carvajal
- Lucy Koh
- 5:20-cv-02858
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 20
In Khouanmany v. Carvajal, Judge Koh reopened the case, granted a fee waiver, and dismissed one claim with amendment allowed and four without it.
Vilaychith Khouanmany, a federal prisoner seeking earned-time credits, home confinement, medical relief, and release; the Bureau of Prisons and the sentencing court were affected by the court's limits on the relief available in this case.
What happened
In Khouanmany v. Carvajal, Vilaychith Khouanmany challenged her federal imprisonment, including earned-time credits, prison conditions, medical care, and possible home confinement. Judge Lucy H. Koh reopened the case after an appeals-court order and vacated the earlier judgment that had closed it.
The court granted Khouanmany permission to proceed without paying the filing fee. It dismissed the earned-time-credit claim but allowed her to amend it to explain why she had not completed the prison appeal process and why the claim was ready for review. The court dismissed the other claims without leave to amend, although it said some could be pursued in separate civil-rights proceedings or in the sentencing court.
Judge Koh ordered Khouanmany to file an amended petition or a notice choosing to end the case within 45 days. The court warned that failing to do so would result in dismissal with prejudice, meaning the case could not be brought again in that form.
The detailed version
- Khouanmany v. Carvajal · No. 5:20-cv-02858
- Lucy Koh
- May 28, 2021
Background
Vilaychith Khouanmany, who was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Dublin, California, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging several aspects of her imprisonment. The petition asserted five claims identified in an appeals-court order: denial of earned-time credits and an allegedly improper Bureau of Prisons risk assessment; an allegedly improper incident report; entitlement to halfway-house or home confinement; inadequate medical care; and release under the Second Chance Act, First Step Act, and Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. In her later motion to reopen, she also raised retaliation by prison officials.
The court had originally dismissed the petition without prejudice after Khouanmany did not timely submit a complete application to proceed without paying the filing fee. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a later filing should be treated as a timely request for reconsideration and relief from that judgment, and it sent the matter back for further consideration. On remand, the court granted Khouanmany's motion to reopen and vacated the earlier judgment. It also granted her application to proceed without paying the filing fee.
Claim 1: earned-time credits and risk assessment
The court dismissed Claim 1 with leave to amend. It found that Khouanmany had not exhausted the Bureau of Prisons' administrative-appeal process. That process generally requires an inmate to seek review at the prison, regional, and central-office levels before filing a federal petition. Khouanmany filed the federal petition only two days after sending her formal appeal to the warden, before the warden's response was due.
The court also stated that the earned-time-credit portion of Claim 1 might not be ripe, meaning the legal injury might depend on future events that had not yet occurred. The court allowed amendment so Khouanmany could explain why the exhaustion requirement should be excused and why the claim was ready for judicial review. The court stated that, if she did not persuade it on those points, Claim 1 would be dismissed without prejudice to filing a new petition after the claim became ripe and the administrative process was properly exhausted.
Claim 2: incident report
The court dismissed Claim 2 without leave to amend. It concluded that the claim concerned an incident report issued while Khouanmany was incarcerated in Arizona, so it was not properly brought in the Northern District of California. The court also noted that she had already raised the claim in a civil-rights case in the District of Arizona, where the complaint had been dismissed and an appeal was pending. Finally, the court held that the incident-report allegations challenged prison conditions rather than the lawfulness or duration of confinement and therefore belonged, if pursued, in a civil-rights action rather than a habeas petition.
The court stated that this dismissal was without prejudice to renewing the claim in a civil-rights action in the District of Arizona after the Ninth Circuit resolved the pending appeal.
Home-confinement claim
The court dismissed the claim seeking halfway-house or home confinement without leave to amend. It held that the Second Chance Act, First Step Act, and CARES Act give the Bureau of Prisons discretion over home-confinement decisions and do not authorize this court to order such a transfer. A request to modify the sentence through compassionate release would instead have to be made in the sentencing court.
The court stated that this dismissal was without prejudice to filing a compassionate-release motion in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, the sentencing court.
Medical-care and retaliation claims
The court dismissed the medical-care and retaliation claims without leave to amend. It explained that requests concerning prison conditions, including medical treatment or retaliation, generally must be brought in a civil-rights action rather than through habeas relief. To the extent Khouanmany sought release because of inadequate medical care, the court reached the merits and held that her allegations did not show that no constitutionally acceptable medical treatment could be provided in prison. The court noted that the petition indicated she had received medical treatment in the past.
The court stated that dismissal of these claims was without prejudice to renewing them in a civil-rights action.
Release claim
The court dismissed the claim seeking release under the Second Chance Act, First Step Act, and CARES Act without leave to amend. It held that Khouanmany, who the opinion stated was 46 years old, was not eligible for release under the Second Chance Act's elderly-offender provision, and that the listed medical conditions were not identified as terminal illnesses. The court also explained that transfer to prerelease custody or home confinement is not a release from imprisonment. It said that any request for compassionate release under the First Step Act should be directed to the sentencing court, while the CARES Act did not authorize judicially ordered release or home confinement.
Further instructions and disposition
The court ordered Khouanmany to file, within 45 days, either an amended petition or a notice stating whether she chose to end the proceeding. Any amended petition had to include all habeas claims she intended to pursue, could not incorporate the earlier petition by reference, and could not renew Claims 2 through 5. If she failed to file an amended petition or notice within the deadline, the court stated that the case would be dismissed with prejudice. The court also warned that failure to comply with its orders could lead to dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Classification
This is a mixed ruling. The court disposed of most claims on threshold or procedural grounds, including exhaustion, ripeness, venue, the proper type of action, and the court's authority to order home confinement. But it also reached the merits of the medical-care claim to the extent Khouanmany sought release based on that care and found the allegations insufficient.
Read the full 20-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.