Donahue v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
- Maxine Chesney
- 3:21-cv-00448
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 5
In Donahue v. Union Pacific, Judge Chesney granted Union Pacific’s partial pleadings motion, dismissed Count III, and denied amendment over an untimely accommodation claim.
Justin Donahue, Jason Campbell, and Jacob Goss lost their ADA failure-to-accommodate claim against Union Pacific Railroad Company at this stage; the order did not state a disposition for their two other ADA claims.
What happened
In Donahue v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, former conductors Justin Donahue, Jason Campbell, and Jacob Goss alleged that Union Pacific removed them from service because of actual or perceived disabilities involving color vision and failed to provide reasonable accommodations. They brought three claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act: unequal treatment, unequal effects, and failure to accommodate.
Union Pacific challenged only the failure-to-accommodate claim, arguing that the plaintiffs had not completed the required administrative process within the legal deadline. The plaintiffs argued that the deadline should have been paused while an earlier class action, Harris, was pending. The court ruled that the earlier case paused deadlines only for claims based on the same facts and legal theories, and that it did not cover the plaintiffs’ later failure-to-accommodate claim.
The court therefore held that Count III was time-barred, granted Union Pacific’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, and dismissed Count III. It also denied the plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint because the proposed amendment would not cure the time problem. Judge Chesney signed the order on June 16, 2021.
The detailed version
- Donahue v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · No. 3:21-cv-00448
- Maxine Chesney
- June 16, 2021
Background
Justin Donahue, Jason Campbell, and Jacob Goss alleged that they formerly worked as conductors for Union Pacific Railroad Company. They alleged that Union Pacific removed them from service under its Fitness-for-Duty program because of actual or perceived disabilities, specifically involving their ability to see color. They also alleged that Union Pacific failed to provide reasonable accommodations after removing them from service.
The complaint asserted three Americans with Disabilities Act claims: Count I for disability discrimination under a disparate-treatment theory, Count II for disability discrimination under a disparate-impact theory, and Count III for failure to accommodate.
Motions and Arguments
Union Pacific moved for partial judgment on the pleadings as to Count III. Judgment on the pleadings is a ruling based on the allegations and permitted materials in the pleadings, without a trial. Union Pacific argued that none of the plaintiffs had exhausted the required administrative remedies within the applicable limitations period. The plaintiffs did not claim that they had exhausted their remedies within that period. Instead, they argued that the deadline had been paused under the rule that can temporarily stop the limitations period for putative class members while a class action is pending.
The plaintiffs relied on the earlier class action Harris, in which they were putative class members. The court took judicial notice of the operative complaint in that action. The plaintiffs also moved for leave to file a first amended complaint, seeking to add factual allegations concerning their failure-to-accommodate claim.
Court’s Analysis
The court explained that filing a class action generally pauses the statute of limitations for claims asserted on behalf of the putative class until class certification is denied. The pause is limited, however, to later claims based on the same claims and factual basis as those asserted in the class action. It does not give a plaintiff unlimited time to bring different or peripheral claims after the class action ends.
In Harris, the class claims challenged Union Pacific’s Fitness-for-Duty program under disparate-treatment and disparate-impact theories. Those claims essentially corresponded to Counts I and II in this case. The court noted that Union Pacific did not argue that the plaintiffs were unable to obtain the benefit of tolling for Counts I and II.
The court concluded that Harris did not assert a failure-to-accommodate claim on behalf of the putative class members. It further concluded that the applicable legal elements and core facts differed. In particular, Count III concerned events allegedly occurring after the plaintiffs’ removal from service, while the Harris class claims concerned the events giving rise to the removal-related claims. Because Harris did not give Union Pacific fair notice of the failure-to-accommodate claim, the court held that Count III was time-barred.
Disposition
The court granted Union Pacific’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Count III. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend because the proposed amendment would be futile—that is, it would still be barred by the statute of limitations. The order did not state a disposition for Counts I and II.
Judge Maxine M. Chesney dated and signed the order on June 16, 2021.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.