Johnson v. Dizdar

Background

Scott Johnson alleged that Mary Ann Dizdar owned real property in Sunnyvale, California, where the business “848 W. Evelyn Ave Automotive Center” operated. Johnson alleged that the automotive center was open to the public and inaccessible to people with disabilities, including because it provided parking but not wheelchair-accessible parking. He alleged that the barriers caused him difficulty and discomfort and that they could be removed or addressed through alternative accommodations.

Johnson alleged that he visited the automotive center in October 2020, intending in part to assess compliance with disability-access laws. He also alleged that he was deterred from returning because of existing and possible additional barriers, but that he would return once the center was represented to him as accessible. He asserted claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. The opinion states that Johnson is a California resident with level C-5 quadriplegia, uses a wheelchair, and has a specially equipped van.

Arguments on the Motion

Dizdar moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Dizdar argued that Johnson had not adequately alleged that the property was a place of public accommodation and had not adequately alleged that he would return to the property.

Dizdar also asked the court to take judicial notice of facts from a report and declaration stating that the automotive center had no public parking, provided access by appointment only, and had not been altered since its construction. Johnson disputed the facts about public parking and access.

Public Accommodation

The court concluded that Johnson adequately alleged that the automotive center was a place of public accommodation. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court generally accepts factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the nonmoving party unless judicially noticeable facts contradict them.

The court denied Dizdar’s request for judicial notice. It found that Dizdar had not shown that the requested facts were generally known or could be accurately determined from sources whose accuracy could not reasonably be questioned. The court also found that the facts were disputed, and disputed facts in the submitted materials could not be judicially noticed for purposes of resolving the motion.

Because Johnson alleged that the automotive center was “a facility open to the public, a place of public accommodation, and a business establishment,” the court held that he had adequately pleaded the public-accommodation issue. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss on that ground.

Return Intent and Standing

The court also held that Johnson adequately alleged an imminent injury sufficient for standing to seek injunctive relief. Standing is the requirement that a plaintiff show an actual or imminent injury connected to the defendant’s conduct that a court can remedy. For a private ADA plaintiff seeking an injunction, the plaintiff must allege a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.

The court found that Johnson alleged both that he had visited the automotive center and that accessibility barriers currently deterred him from returning. Under Ninth Circuit precedent discussed in the opinion, those allegations were enough at the pleading stage to support an imminent ADA injury.

Dizdar argued that Johnson’s intent to return was not sincere because he had filed many other lawsuits involving automotive facilities and lived more than 130 miles away. The court stated that it could not consider Johnson’s other lawsuits when assessing his intent to return and noted precedent finding standing even when a plaintiff lived about 550 miles from the property at issue. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss on the return-intent ground.

Disposition

The court denied Mary Ann Dizdar’s motion to dismiss. The opinion does not enter a final ruling on whether the alleged ADA or Unruh Civil Rights Act violations occurred; it holds that Johnson’s allegations were sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.