Doe v. San Jose Unified School District Board

Background

The Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA), Elizabeth Sinclair, and Charlotte Klarke alleged that officials acting for the San Jose Unified School District discriminated against FCA’s religious viewpoint, withdrew recognition from FCA-affiliated student groups, removed benefits that other noncurriculum-related groups continued to receive, and allowed harassment of FCA students. The claims concerned, among other things, FCA’s Sexual Purity Statement.

The plaintiffs’ complaints asserted 12 related claims involving free speech, expressive association, free exercise of religion, equal protection, the Equal Access Act, compelled speech, unconstitutional conditions, and retaliation. The opinion states that all 12 claims were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a way to sue for certain violations of federal rights by state or local officials. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages.

In an earlier round of this case, the court had granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss and had allowed amendment concerning claims for prospective relief. The court also instructed the plaintiffs that they could not add new claims or parties without permission or the defendants’ agreement.

Requested amendment

The proposed Third Amended Complaint added Pioneer High School’s FCA chapter as a plaintiff and Deputy Superintendent Stephen McMahon as a defendant. It did not add any causes of action. The plaintiffs alleged that the student chapter continued to face the same alleged derecognition, discrimination, and harassment, and that McMahon had authority over student-group recognition and had directly participated in or enforced the decisions concerning FCA chapters.

The defendants opposed amendment on three grounds: adding the parties would cause undue prejudice, McMahon was unnecessary, and adding the Pioneer FCA chapter would be futile because it would not solve FCA’s alleged standing or mootness problems.

Court’s reasoning

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), courts generally should freely allow amendments when justice requires. The court explained that amendment should ordinarily be allowed unless there is undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to fix earlier deficiencies, undue prejudice, or futility.

The court rejected the defendants’ prejudice arguments. Additional discovery costs alone were not enough to deny amendment. The Pioneer FCA chapter had been central to the allegations from the beginning, and the case had already involved discovery concerning the chapter. McMahon had also already submitted two declarations in the case. The court further found that the defendants had not shown that adding the parties would prevent them from defending the case or that the timing of the amendment was sufficiently prejudicial.

The court also rejected the argument that McMahon was unnecessary. The proposed complaint alleged that he had authority over recognition of student groups and had participated in or enforced the challenged decisions. The court concluded that the defendants’ argument was neither a valid reason to deny amendment nor an accurate description of the proposed complaint.

The court did not decide whether the Pioneer FCA chapter ultimately had standing to seek prospective relief. Instead, it held that the proposed allegations met the liberal standard for allowing amendment and reserved the standing issue for a possible motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. The court likewise found that the defendants had not made the strong showing of mootness required at this stage. Among other allegations, the plaintiffs claimed that recognition could be withdrawn again and that protests could resume when in-person classes returned.

Disposition

Judge Lucy H. Koh granted the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the Third Amended Complaint. The plaintiffs were allowed to file it by July 15, 2021. Because the amended complaint would replace the Second Amended Complaint, the court denied as moot the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. The order stated that the defendants could file another motion to dismiss after the Third Amended Complaint was filed or after the amendment deadline passed. This order addressed amendment and the pending dismissal motion; it did not decide the ultimate merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.