Johnson v. Rando

Background

Scott Johnson alleged that he is a C-5 quadriplegic who uses a wheelchair and a specially equipped van. He alleged that he visited 354 Umbarger Rd Center in July and August 2020 and found that the center lacked wheelchair-accessible parking required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He further alleged that the parking barriers deterred him from returning, although he would return once the center and its facilities were represented to him as accessible.

Johnson sued Marissa Rando, individually and as trustee of The Marissa Rando 2015 Revocable Trust dated January 26, 2015. He asserted a claim under Title III of the ADA, which addresses access to privately operated public accommodations, and a claim under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. Rando represented herself and moved to dismiss all claims.

Analysis

The court first considered Rando’s argument under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which allows dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Rando argued that Johnson’s ADA claim was moot because ADA-compliant parking had been installed before the complaint was filed. The court explained that a private ADA plaintiff seeking an injunction must show a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. It also explained that a claim can become moot when later events make it clear that the alleged violation cannot reasonably recur and the violation’s effects have been completely eliminated.

The court found that Rando had not submitted undisputed evidence showing that the parking lot was ADA-compliant. An inspection report described upgrades that needed to be made but did not clearly show that they had been completed. A contractor’s receipt described striping, wheel stops, and signs, but there were no photographs or declaration from a certified access specialist establishing that the completed features complied with the ADA. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) on the mootness theory.

The court next considered Rando’s arguments under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally sufficient claim. The court held that Rando could be a proper ADA defendant because, as the alleged property owner and landlord, she could have ADA obligations even if she had no business interest in or control over the tenant businesses. As to her trustee capacity, the court accepted Johnson’s allegation that she owned the business center through the trust.

The court also declined to decide at the motion-to-dismiss stage whether the business center was a place of public accommodation. Although Rando relied on an inspection report stating that some spaces were used for storage and lacked public access, Johnson alleged that the business center was at least partially open to the public. The court treated the issue as a factual dispute and assumed at this stage that the business center and its parking lot were at least partially open to the public.

The court likewise declined to resolve the parties’ conflicting accounts about when the ADA parking signs were installed. Rando submitted declarations supporting her assertion that the signs were installed after Johnson’s visits, but the court was required to accept Johnson’s well-pleaded allegations as true when deciding whether he had stated a claim.

Unruh Act Claim and Disposition

The court stated that an ADA violation constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. Because it found that Johnson’s ADA claim could proceed, it also denied Rando’s motion to dismiss the Unruh Act claim.

The court denied Rando’s motion to dismiss in full. The opinion did not decide whether Johnson ultimately proved either claim; it held that the claims could not be dismissed at this early stage based on the arguments presented.