Reed v. Koenig

Background

Rickey T. Reed, a state prisoner representing himself, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the denial of early parole consideration under California’s Proposition 57. He also filed requests to proceed without paying the filing fee.

The petition stated that Reed had been convicted of 10 counts under California Penal Code § 288 involving lewd acts with a child under 14 and had received a sentence of 514 years to life in state prison. Reed claimed that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation improperly excluded him from early parole consideration because he qualified as a nonviolent offender.

Reed had challenged the exclusion in state court. The state superior court concluded that he was ineligible because he was serving time for kidnapping to commit a lewd act under California Penal Code § 207(b), and kidnapping is listed as a violent felony under Penal Code § 667.5(c)(14). The California Supreme Court later denied his petition without prejudice to possible relief after deciding another case.

Court’s analysis

The court first explained that federal habeas relief is available for custody violating the Constitution, federal laws, or treaties, but not for an alleged mistake in interpreting or applying state law. The court concluded that Reed’s claim essentially challenged the state courts’ interpretation of Proposition 57 and therefore did not state a claim for federal habeas relief.

The court also held that federal habeas jurisdiction was lacking because success on Reed’s Proposition 57 claim would not necessarily result in earlier release. Proposition 57, if applicable, would make him eligible for parole consideration, but would not require his release; he would still have to be found suitable for parole.

The court stated that a challenge of this type could potentially be brought as a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that allows claims for violations of federal rights by state actors. The court declined to convert the habeas petition into such an action because the habeas form did not provide information that a civil-rights complaint would typically require, including the intended defendants, the connection between each defendant and the claims, and the requested relief. The court expressly did not decide whether a § 1983 claim would succeed or could properly be stated.

Disposition

Judge Edward J. Davila dismissed the habeas petition for lack of federal habeas jurisdiction. The dismissal was without prejudice to Reed filing a new civil-rights action challenging the application of Proposition 57 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, preferably on the court’s civil-rights complaint form.

The court determined that no certificate of appealability was warranted. It granted Reed’s motion for leave to proceed without paying the filing fee and denied the previously filed filing-fee motion as moot. The order terminated the docket entries concerning those motions.