Gescheidt v. Haaland

Background

Plaintiffs Jack Gescheidt, Laura Chariton, Skyler Thomas, and the Animal Legal Defense Fund sued the National Park Service and other defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act. They challenged the agency’s management of the tule elk population at Tomales Point in Point Reyes National Seashore.

Plaintiffs alleged that drought conditions had caused elk to die from inadequate food and water. They argued that the Park Service had unreasonably delayed revising its 1980 General Management Plan and its 1998 Tule Elk Management Plan. They also challenged the agency’s decisions concerning whether to provide the elk with adequate forage and water.

The motion addressed only plaintiffs’ claim that the Park Service had unreasonably delayed revising the 1980 General Management Plan. Plaintiffs asked the court to order immediate measures, including providing supplemental food and water to all four Tomales Point herds or removing the fence separating the elk from adjacent public lands.

The parties’ evidence

Plaintiffs’ experts attributed the deaths of some elk to starvation or significant nutrient deficiencies and pointed to evidence of dehydration and poisonous plants in several elk. Plaintiffs argued that the Park Service’s existing measures were inadequate and that the fence prevented the elk from reaching additional resources.

The Park Service presented evidence that it had monitored water sources, conducted necropsies, installed supplemental water systems in June 2021, and continued monitoring the elk. It stated that most elk observed by its staff appeared to be in good or excellent condition. The Park Service also identified potential problems with supplemental feeding, including increased disease transmission, dependence on artificial food, population growth, and harm to vegetation and range health.

Court’s analysis

The court determined that plaintiffs were seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction. A prohibitory injunction preserves the existing situation, while a mandatory injunction requires a party to take affirmative action. Because the fence had existed since at least 1980 and the Park Service generally had not provided supplemental food or water, the requested relief would change the existing situation.

A party seeking a preliminary injunction ordinarily must show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, that the balance of hardships favors the party, and that an injunction serves the public interest. For a mandatory injunction, the burden is especially high: the law and facts must clearly favor the requesting party.

The court held that plaintiffs had not met that burden. Under Section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, a court may require an agency to take action that the law requires but does not permit the court to dictate the specific manner of action when the agency retains discretion. The court concluded that, even if plaintiffs ultimately prevailed on their unreasonable-delay claim, it might be able to require revision of the 1980 plan, but plaintiffs had not shown that the court could require the Park Service to remove the fence or provide specified food and water.

The court also found that the evidence about the elk’s condition and the appropriate management response was disputed. It stated that the record did not show that the law and facts clearly favored plaintiffs. Because plaintiffs had not met the required burden, the court did not consider the remaining preliminary-injunction factors.

Disposition

The court DENIES the motion for preliminary injunction. It also set a case management conference for August 17, 2021, and directed the parties to address how to move the case forward, including a proposed schedule for summary-judgment motions.