Matias Rauda v. Garland

Background

Willian Matias Rauda asked the court for a writ of mandamus—a court order requiring a federal official or agency to perform a duty—and moved for a temporary restraining order. Both requests sought to require the Attorney General, the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to direct the BIA to decide Rauda’s motion to reopen his immigration proceedings by August 13, 2021. The temporary restraining order request also sought a stay of removal while the court considered the mandamus petition.

The opinion states that Rauda is a national of El Salvador who had lived in the United States since February 2014. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained him in November 2018 and began removal proceedings. After unsuccessful appeals to the BIA and the Ninth Circuit, Rauda moved to reopen the proceedings based on developments in El Salvador that, he argued, undermined the finding that he was unlikely to be tortured there. His motion to reopen remained pending.

Jurisdiction

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over both the mandamus petition and the temporary restraining order motion. Although federal law generally gives district courts jurisdiction over mandamus actions seeking to compel federal agencies to perform duties owed to a plaintiff, the court applied more specific provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9), questions of law or fact arising from removal-related activity may be reviewed only through a petition for review of a final removal order filed in the appropriate court of appeals. The court concluded that the BIA’s handling of a motion to reopen a removal proceeding is part of that proceeding. Therefore, Rauda’s claim that the BIA had unreasonably delayed deciding his motion arose from the removal proceeding and could not be heard in the district court.

Alternative Merits Analysis

The court added that, even if it had jurisdiction, it would deny the mandamus petition and temporary restraining order motion. Mandamus requires a clear and certain claim, a definite and nondiscretionary duty, and no other adequate remedy. The court found that Rauda had not met those requirements.

The court explained that the relevant regulation requires the BIA to act promptly, prioritize detained individuals, and generally decide cases assigned to one Board member within 90 days after the record is complete. But the same regulation states that those time limits are internal management directives and do not create rights enforceable in court.

The court also considered Rauda’s argument under the Administrative Procedure Act, which permits a court to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. The parties agreed that the court would evaluate the delay using six factors concerning the reasonableness of the timing, the governing statutory scheme, health and welfare concerns, competing agency priorities, the interests harmed by delay, and possible agency misconduct. The court found that these factors did not clearly and certainly favor Rauda. Congress had not set a deadline for motions to reopen, the government acknowledged only a duty to act at a reasonable pace, and Rauda’s motion had been pending for roughly the average time required for the BIA to decide an appeal.

Disposition

The court denied Rauda’s petition for a writ of mandamus and denied his motion for a temporary restraining order. Because those requests were denied, the court denied as moot his request to stay removal while the mandamus petition was being considered. The order was signed by Judge Charles R. Breyer.