Oliver v. Madsen

Background

Anthony Wayne Oliver, a state prisoner housed at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed this pro se civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officers at that facility. His first amended complaint was the operative complaint. The court had previously screened that complaint, dismissed some non-cognizable claims with prejudice, identified deficiencies in other claims, and identified claims that could proceed. Oliver then notified the court that he wanted to proceed on the cognizable claims and dismiss the others.

Claims

Oliver’s allegations concerned events from July 2019 through November 2019. They included retaliatory cell searches, repeated delays in access to the library, allegedly false rules-violation reports, unfounded referrals for mental-health assessment, and allegedly retaliatory restrictions on the G-Wing.

The court identified the following claims as cognizable under § 1983: retaliation claims against H. Madsen and Lt. Arlene Stephens, and retaliation claims based on supervisor liability against K. Thompson, Sgt. Angel Hernandez, Lt. B. Hopkins, and Warden Craig Koenig. The court also identified excessive-force claims against Correctional Officer S. Mora and H. Madsen. It exercised supplemental jurisdiction over negligence claims against Mora and Madsen based on injuries from the September 7, 2019 incident, and over a damages claim based on negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Order

The court ordered that the action proceed on the retaliation, excessive-force, and related state-law claims described in the order. All other claims that had not already been dismissed for failure to state a claim were stricken from the amended complaint after Oliver elected to dismiss them.

The court ordered service on H. Madsen, Lt. Arlene Stephens, K. Thompson, Sgt. Angel Hernandez, Lt. B. Hopkins, Warden Craig Koenig, and Correctional Officer S. Mora. It directed the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to process electronic service information and directed the clerk to arrange service through the United States Marshals Service for defendants who did not waive service.

The defendants were ordered to file a motion for summary judgment or another dispositive motion within 91 days after the order was filed. Oliver’s opposition was due 28 days after any such motion, and the defendants’ reply was due 14 days after the opposition. The order also permitted discovery, required Oliver to serve copies of his court communications on the defendants or their counsel, and warned that failure to prosecute or comply with court orders could lead to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

What the Order Did Not Decide

This was a preliminary screening and case-management order. It did not decide the ultimate merits of the retaliation, excessive-force, negligence, or emotional-distress claims.