Lewis v. Calvin

Background

Cherie M. Lewis brought an employment-discrimination case against Oakland Unified School District and Lynette Calvin. Lewis began working as a substitute for the District in March 2016, and Calvin hired and supervised her. Lewis alleged that, on February 7, 2019, she took a scheduled lunch break in the front office while speaking with an insurance adjuster about her car. She became frustrated and used the word “damn.” After school staff made a negative complaint, Calvin called Lewis, yelled at her, made accusations that Lewis considered unfounded, and did not allow Lewis to explain her side. Lewis alleged that Calvin treated her differently because of her race and then canceled her substitute jobs for the rest of February 2019.

Lewis’s amended complaint asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. She alleged race, age, and disability discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and possibly wrongful termination. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. They argued that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Americans with Disabilities Act claims were barred by state immunity and that Lewis had not alleged required elements of her claims. Lewis did not oppose the motion.

Rulings

The court granted the motion to dismiss Lewis’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Americans with Disabilities Act claims. It ruled that the District, as a California school district, was protected by the Eleventh Amendment from those claims. The court also ruled that monetary-damages claims against Calvin were barred. The court stated that a claim against Calvin in her official capacity could potentially proceed if Lewis sought an injunction requiring her to stop an ongoing violation of federal law. The court therefore dismissed the claims without leave to amend as to the District and with leave to amend as to Calvin, but only for that limited type of claim.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the retaliation claim with leave to amend because Lewis did not allege that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII or the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. It also granted the motion with leave to amend as to any wrongful-termination claim because Lewis did not allege that she had been terminated.

The court denied the motion to dismiss Lewis’s Title VII and California Fair Employment and Housing Act discrimination claims. At this stage, the court found that her allegations that Calvin accused her about her job performance and treated other employees differently were enough to provide fair notice and make those claims plausible. The court granted the motion to dismiss the harassment claim with leave to amend, finding that the alleged conduct during one telephone call was not sufficiently severe or repeated to create an abusive work environment. The court’s conclusion stated that the defendants’ motion was granted in part and denied in part, and set September 9, 2021, as the deadline for an amended complaint.

Classification

This is a procedural order because the court ruled on a motion to dismiss, addressing immunity and whether the complaint adequately stated claims rather than finally deciding whether the alleged discrimination occurred.