Chappell v. Saul

Background

Hilliard Chappell, III applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act. He alleged disability beginning June 1, 2002, based on multiple physical conditions, including shoulder and back injuries, gout, leg surgery, and an Achilles’ tendon injury. He also reported depression, anxiety, and chronic pain.

An administrative law judge found that Chappell had severe physical impairments but that his mental impairments were not severe. The judge determined that Chappell had the residual functional capacity—meaning the most he could still do despite his impairments—to perform a reduced range of light work. Based on vocational-expert testimony, the judge found that Chappell could work as a callout operator or telephone quotation clerk and denied benefits. The Appeals Council declined review, making the administrative law judge’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision.

Chappell moved for summary judgment, asking the court to reverse the denial and remand with instructions to award benefits. He argued that the administrative law judge erred by not treating his mental impairments as severe and by failing to give legally sufficient reasons for rejecting his testimony about the intensity and effects of his symptoms.

Mental-impairment claim

The court denied Chappell’s motion for summary judgment on the mental-impairment issue. Dr. Martin had diagnosed unspecified anxiety disorder, unspecified depressive disorder, and unspecified somatic symptom disorder, and had described moderate limitations in several work-related areas. But Dr. Martin’s form defined “moderate” as more than a slight limitation while still allowing satisfactory functioning, and he left blank spaces asking him to identify facts supporting the assessments.

The court concluded that Chappell had not shown that Dr. Martin’s opinions required a finding that the mental impairments were severe under the Social Security regulations. The court also found that the administrative law judge gave clear reasons supported by the record for the weight assigned to Dr. Martin’s opinions, including the lack of a stated basis for some assessments.

Symptom testimony

The court granted Chappell’s motion on his challenge to the rejection of his symptom testimony. Because the administrative law judge did not find that Chappell was exaggerating or fabricating his symptoms and acknowledged that his impairments could reasonably cause them, the judge needed to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting the testimony about their severity.

The administrative law judge instead stated generally that Chappell’s statements were not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence. The judge did not identify which testimony was being rejected or which evidence contradicted it. The court held that this was reversible legal error and that the error was not harmless because it prevented meaningful judicial review.

The court also determined that the error affected the step-five work determination. Chappell testified that pain limited his standing, walking, and lifting, that he sometimes became bedridden for a week because of gout, and that he might need at least two absences per month or an additional fifteen-minute break each day. The vocational expert testified that two absences per month would preclude competitive employment and that a chronic need for an additional fifteen-minute break would eventually result in termination.

Remedy and disposition

The court applied the Ninth Circuit’s “credit-as-true” rule, under which improperly rejected testimony is treated as established when the record is fully developed, the administrative law judge gave legally insufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence, and crediting the evidence would require a disability finding. The court found all three requirements satisfied and found no serious doubt in the record about whether Chappell was disabled.

The court therefore granted in part and denied in part Chappell’s motion for summary judgment. It reversed the Commissioner’s conclusion that Chappell had not been disabled from June 1, 2002, through the date of the administrative law judge’s decision, and remanded with instructions to calculate and award benefits. The clerk was directed to enter judgment for Chappell against the Commissioner and close the case.