Johnson v. Jew
- Edward Davila
- 5:20-cv-08457
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 11
In Scott Johnson v. Tom C. Jew, Judge Davila denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding Johnson adequately alleged standing under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Scott Johnson, Tom C. Jew, and Diane H. Nakagawa Jew. The motion to dismiss was denied, so the order did not dismiss Johnson’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
What happened
Scott Johnson, a wheelchair user with quadriplegia, sued Tom C. Jew and Diane H. Nakagawa Jew over alleged accessibility barriers at their dentistry business, including inaccessible parking and door hardware. He also alleged retaliation after filing the lawsuit.
The defendants argued that Johnson lacked constitutional standing because he could not show a real and immediate threat of future harm, especially after Dr. Jew said he would not treat Johnson in the future. The court rejected those arguments, explaining that Johnson alleged he had encountered the barriers, regularly visited the area, intended to return, and was deterred by the alleged barriers. His motivation to assess compliance with disability-access laws did not defeat standing.
The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Judge Edward J. Davila did not decide whether the alleged accessibility or retaliation violations ultimately occurred; he held only that Johnson’s allegations were sufficient to allow the case to proceed at this stage.
The detailed version
- Johnson v. Jew · No. 5:20-cv-08457
- Edward Davila
- Aug. 16, 2021
Background
Scott Johnson alleged that he is a level C-5 quadriplegic who uses a wheelchair and has significant manual-dexterity impairments. He claimed that he visited the defendants’ general dentistry business on or about September 29, 2020, and personally encountered disability-related barriers, including inaccessible parking stalls and door hardware. According to the First Amended Complaint, those barriers denied him full and equal access to the business and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act.
Johnson also alleged that he regularly visits the Santa Clara area, intends to return to the dentistry business, and is currently deterred from doing so until the facilities are represented to be accessible. He further alleged that Dr. Jew retaliated against him for filing the ADA lawsuit by refusing to provide him services in the future, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
Motion and Arguments
Tom C. Jew and Diane H. Nakagawa Jew moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which permits a defendant to challenge the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. They made both a factual and a facial challenge to standing under Article III of the Constitution.
The factual challenge relied on Dr. Jew’s declaration stating that he would not accept Johnson as a patient in the future. The defendants argued that this meant Johnson had no reason to return to the business and therefore faced no imminent risk of encountering the alleged barriers again. They also disputed Johnson’s retaliation theory, asserting that Dr. Jew’s decision was based on a breakdown of trust and honesty rather than disability discrimination or retaliation.
The facial challenge argued that Johnson had not genuinely intended to return and was not truly deterred because he had never been Dr. Jew’s patient. The defendants also relied on prior district court decisions applying factors such as the business’s proximity to the plaintiff’s residence, past patronage, plans to return, and frequency of travel near the business.
Court’s Analysis
The court first granted the defendants’ requests for judicial notice of six documents, including government records and Google Maps navigation directions. The court then addressed Article III standing, which requires a plaintiff seeking an injunction under the ADA to show a real and immediate threat of repeated future injury. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, a plaintiff may satisfy this requirement by alleging an actual injury together with an intent to return, or by showing that accessibility barriers deter the plaintiff from returning.
Regarding the factual challenge, the court reasoned that Johnson could encounter the alleged exterior barriers even if Dr. Jew never personally treated him. For example, Johnson might want to enter the facility to ask about making an appointment but be unable to do so because of the alleged barriers. The court also found that Dr. Jew’s explanation for refusing to treat Johnson could support, rather than defeat, the alleged retaliation claim because Dr. Jew connected the refusal to the parties’ adverse litigation relationship. The court stated that refusing to serve a customer because the customer sued to enforce the ADA is the type of conduct that section 12203(a) prohibits. It also rejected the argument that an injunction would necessarily require Dr. Jew to treat Johnson, noting that Johnson sought relief aimed at bringing the property into compliance with the ADA and Unruh Act and did not specifically request an order requiring treatment.
Regarding the facial challenge, the court held that Johnson had alleged facts sufficient to establish an imminent ADA injury. He alleged that he had visited the business, personally encountered accessibility barriers, intended to return, and was currently deterred from returning until the barriers and alleged retaliatory policies were addressed. The court also explained that Johnson’s motivation to test ADA compliance did not defeat standing and that controlling Ninth Circuit precedent did not permit the court to question his intent based solely on his history of ADA litigation.
Disposition
The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The ruling determined only that Johnson had Article III standing at the pleading stage; it did not decide whether the defendants violated the ADA or the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The opinion was signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on August 16, 2021.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.