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N.D. Cal.Substantive rulingFiled Sept. 1, 2021

Bulandr v. Robertson

Judge
Beth Freeman
Docket
5:19-cv-07942
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
21
Civil RightsSection 1983First AmendmentPro Se
In one sentence

In Bulandr v. Robertson, Judge Freeman granted defendants’ summary-judgment motion and dismissed Bulandr’s free-exercise and equal-protection claims with prejudice.

Who this affects

Ian Anthany Bulandr’s federal civil-rights claims against J. Robertson, G. Abdullah, S. Kinney, R. Losacco, and D. Ater were resolved against him; the claims were dismissed with prejudice.

What happened

In Bulandr v. Robertson, Ian Anthany Bulandr, a state prisoner representing himself, sued prison officials under a federal civil-rights law. He said officials failed to provide kosher meals for 23 days and denied him Jewish religious literature while he was housed in restricted units.

The court ruled that Bulandr had not properly completed the prison grievance process for his kosher-meal claim against R. Losacco. It also found no evidence that the other defendants violated his right to practice his religion or intentionally discriminated against him. The court said the limits on chapel access were related to prison safety and security, and that donated Jewish literature was not regularly available.

Judge Beth Labson Freeman granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed the free-exercise and equal-protection claims against the defendants with prejudice and did not decide the defendants’ qualified-immunity argument.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Bulandr v. Robertson · No. 5:19-cv-07942
Judge
Beth Freeman
Date
Sept. 1, 2021

Background

Ian Anthany Bulandr, a state prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials and employees. He proceeded without a lawyer. The complaint asserted claims under the First Amendment’s protection for religious exercise and the Equal Protection Clause.

Bulandr alleged that kosher food was part of his sincerely held Jewish religious beliefs. After he was moved to the administrative segregation unit on February 9, 2018, he said he did not receive kosher meals for 23 days, from February 10 through March 5. He also alleged that, while housed in the security housing unit, he was denied Jewish religious literature, including the Torah, Talmud, and Tanakh. He contended that Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant prisoners received religious literature while Jewish prisoners did not, and that Jewish literature was available in the chapel to prisoners in the general population but not to prisoners in the security housing unit.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts showed they had not violated Bulandr’s constitutional rights. They also argued that Bulandr had not exhausted the prison grievance process for his claim against Losacco concerning the kosher meals and asserted qualified immunity. Bulandr filed no opposition, but the court treated his verified complaint as evidence opposing the motion where appropriate.

Exhaustion of the kosher-meal claim against Losacco

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to complete available administrative remedies before bringing a federal action about prison conditions. California’s grievance rules required prisoners to identify the staff members involved and describe their involvement.

Bulandr filed one grievance about not receiving kosher meals in the administrative segregation unit. The grievance identified other staff members but did not identify Losacco, even though Bulandr had communicated directly with Losacco about the meals. The court held that the grievance did not give the prison sufficient notice that Bulandr intended to pursue a religious-exercise claim against Losacco. Because the defendants established nonexhaustion and Bulandr did not show that the grievance process was unavailable to him, the court granted summary judgment to Losacco on this claim based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Free-exercise claim concerning kosher meals

The court explained that prisoners may bring a claim when prison officials burden a sincerely held religious practice without a justification reasonably related to legitimate prison interests. The court did not need to decide whether Bulandr’s religious beliefs about kosher food were sincere because it found no evidence that the named defendants refused to provide him a healthy religious diet.

The evidence showed that kitchen staff—not Abdullah, Kinney, or Ater—were responsible for providing the meals. Custodial staff repeatedly contacted the kitchen about missing kosher meals, and Ater specifically called for Bulandr’s meals. Abdullah responded to Bulandr’s request by telling him he was back on the kosher diet, and the evidence showed that Bulandr was already receiving kosher meals by that time. Kinney did not feed Bulandr during the 23-day period at issue and had no role in denying those meals.

The court concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material fact and granted summary judgment to Abdullah, Kinney, and Ater on the kosher-meal claim. The opinion also states that Losacco was entitled to summary judgment on this claim because Bulandr failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Free-exercise claim concerning religious literature

The court found no evidence that Abdullah, Robertson, or Losacco intentionally refused to provide the religious materials Bulandr sought. The evidence showed that prisoners had to purchase religious literature, while donated materials were provided regardless of housing location. Jewish materials such as the Torah and Tanakh were rarely donated, so they were not regularly available for individual distribution.

Although the chapel contained some Jewish literature, including a small number of Torahs, prisoners in the administrative segregation and security housing units could not access the chapel because inmate movement was restricted for safety and security reasons. Bulandr could request that available literature be brought to him by a chaplain, could request pastoral care or speak with a chaplain, and could pray and meditate in his cell. The court noted that Bulandr did not allege that he made a request to a chaplain that was unreasonably denied.

The court held that the restrictions were reasonably related to legitimate prison safety and security interests and that Bulandr had not shown that the lack of literature prevented him from practicing Judaism. It therefore granted summary judgment to Abdullah, Robertson, and Losacco on this claim.

Equal-protection claim

Bulandr claimed that he was treated less favorably than Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant prisoners because those prisoners received Bibles while Jewish literature was unavailable to him. He also compared his treatment with that of Jewish prisoners in the general population who could access Jewish literature in the chapel.

The court found no evidence that prison officials intentionally discriminated against Bulandr because he was Jewish. The availability of free literature depended on donations, and the prison had a large supply of donated Bibles but did not regularly receive the Jewish literature Bulandr requested. The court stated that, if the Jewish materials had been available, Bulandr could have received them while in the security housing unit.

The court also found that Bulandr was not treated differently from similarly situated prisoners in the security housing unit because no prisoners in that unit could access the chapel. Any difference between prisoners in the security housing unit and those in the general population was reasonably related to prison safety and security. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the equal-protection claim.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It dismissed the First Amendment free-exercise and Equal Protection claims against the defendants with prejudice. Because the court found no constitutional violation, it did not decide qualified immunity or the defendants’ arguments concerning punitive damages, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and declaratory relief. The clerk was directed to change Defendant D. Martinez’s name to D. Ater on the docket.

The authoritative version

Read the full 21-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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