Bamforth v. Facebook, Inc.
- Donna Ryu
- 4:20-cv-09483
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 20
In Bamforth v. Facebook, Inc., Judge Ryu granted defendants’ dismissal motion, dismissed all claims with prejudice, and closed the case.
Andrew David Bamforth’s claims against Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg were dismissed with prejudice, and the case was closed. Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted.
What happened
In Bamforth v. Facebook, Inc., Andrew Bamforth, representing himself, claimed that Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg copied or misused Faceparty’s trademarks and engaged in related wrongdoing. He also challenged a 2008 agreement in which he signed over the “FACE” trademark and released claims related to Facebook’s trademarks.
The court ruled that Bamforth’s state-law claims were filed too late and that his allegations did not justify extending the filing deadlines because of his claimed mental disability. The court also ruled that the 2008 agreement released his federal trademark claims. It rejected his arguments that the agreement was invalid or did not apply to him.
Judge Ryu granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed all of Bamforth’s claims with prejudice and directed the Clerk to close the case. The court also denied defendants’ request for judicial notice as moot and denied Bamforth’s motion to file a further reply.
The detailed version
- Bamforth v. Facebook, Inc. · No. 4:20-cv-09483
- Donna Ryu
- Sept. 10, 2021
Background
Andrew David Bamforth, representing himself, sued Facebook, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg. Defendants removed the case from San Mateo County Superior Court based on federal-question jurisdiction. Bamforth alleged that he created and operated Faceparty, which he described as an early social-networking website launched in 2000. He alleged that Facebook, created in 2004, copied Faceparty’s features, blue-and-white color scheme, and use of the word “Face,” causing confusion and harming Faceparty.
Bamforth alleged that he and Facebook had an oral 2006 agreement under which Facebook would not expand beyond colleges or outside the United States. He alleged that Facebook later opened its platform to the general public and the United Kingdom. He also alleged that, in 2008, Facebook’s in-house attorney approached him about settling trademark claims. Bamforth signed an agreement on behalf of CIS Internet Ltd. that assigned the “FACE” trademark to Facebook and released claims relating to Facebook’s trademarks. He alleged that he did not understand the agreement because of a mental disability and that CIS had previously transferred its intellectual-property rights to Anarchy Towers Ltd.
The first amended complaint asserted state-law claims including fraud-related claims, rescission, promissory estoppel, trademark claims, unfair competition, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and interference with prospective economic advantage. It also asserted federal trademark infringement and false-designation-of-origin claims under the Lanham Act. Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). Bamforth opposed the motion.
Additional Requests
Defendants asked the court to take judicial notice of several documents, including the 2008 agreement, trademark records, and other materials. The court stated that it could consider the 2008 agreement under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine because the agreement was integral to Bamforth’s claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court did not rely on the other submitted documents in deciding the motion and denied the request for judicial notice as moot.
Bamforth also sought permission to file a sur-reply. The court denied that motion because he delayed seeking the information and because the proposed filing would contain factual evidence that the court could not consider on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The court stated that the motion was moot and that the proposed additional material would not cure the complaint’s deficiencies in any event.
State-Law Claims
The court held that Bamforth’s state-law claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The court concluded that the complaint placed the relevant events between 2006 and 2008, while the case was filed in 2020.
The court held that the fraud and unjust-enrichment claims were subject to a three-year limitations period; the rescission claim was subject to a four-year period; the oral-promissory-estoppel claim was subject to a two-year period; and the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress and intentional-interference claims were subject to two-year periods. It also held that the California trademark-dilution claim was untimely under a four-year period, that the common-law trademark claim was untimely whether a two-year or four-year period applied, and that the unfair-competition claim was untimely under its four-year period.
Bamforth argued that California statutory tolling applied because of his claimed lack of mental capacity. The court found that the first amended complaint contained few specific facts about his mental condition between 2008 and 2018 and did not plausibly show that he was unable to care for his property, transact business, or understand the effects of his actions throughout that period. The court also found that his allegations were inconsistent: he claimed total incapacity while also alleging that he transferred intellectual-property rights between CIS and Anarchy in 2008. The court concluded that amendment would be futile on this issue.
Bamforth also invoked equitable tolling, which can extend a filing deadline when a plaintiff diligently pursues rights but extraordinary circumstances prevent timely filing. The court found that his allegations did not provide sufficient detail showing that his mental condition made timely filing impossible. It also noted that, although Bamforth alleged that his disability ended in 2018, he did not file the case until October 2020. The court concluded that amendment would be futile on equitable tolling as well.
Federal Trademark Claims
The court held that the 2008 agreement barred Bamforth’s federal trademark-infringement and false-designation-of-origin claims. The agreement released claims relating to Facebook’s use of the Facebook and “FACE” marks. The court rejected Bamforth’s argument that Facebook fraudulently induced him to sign because the related fraud and rescission claims were time-barred.
The court also rejected Bamforth’s arguments that the agreement could not be considered on a motion to dismiss, that he was not bound because CIS—not he personally—signed it, and that CIS had already transferred the marks to Anarchy. The court concluded that the agreement’s language extended to CIS’s officers, directors, employees, investors, shareholders, successors, and assigns, and that Bamforth was bound as CIS’s sole owner and shareholder. The court stated that, even assuming CIS had transferred the marks to Anarchy and Facebook did not acquire ownership through the 2008 agreement, the release still prevented Bamforth from suing Facebook over its use of the marks.
Disposition
The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed Bamforth’s state-law claims with prejudice and dismissed the federal trademark claims with prejudice. In its conclusion, the court stated that all of Bamforth’s claims were dismissed with prejudice and directed the Clerk to close the case.
Read the full 20-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.