Williams v. Diaz

Background

James David Williams, a state prisoner at the Correctional Training Facility, represented himself in a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The remaining defendants were Charles Richey, C. Koenig, and B. D. Min. Williams alleged that prison officials limited his ability to purchase religious oils or musks that he used for daily prayer and meditation. He asserted claims under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). He sought damages and injunctive relief.

The court had previously dismissed Ralph Diaz, D. Chamberlain, Y. Friedman, and K. Hoffman for failure to state a cognizable claim. It also found that Williams could not proceed under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because that statute does not apply to state governments.

Relevant events

In January 2019, Richey sent prison chaplains an email directing them to approve only specified religious oils and two types of musk while changes to the Religious Personal Property Matrix were anticipated. Richey later sent a January 23 email stating that inmates could purchase any musk listed in the current matrix. The court found that the matrix was never formally changed. Richey also informed an approved vendor in April 2019 that it could sell inmates any musk scent.

Williams submitted or attempted to submit purchase forms for religious oils and musks. One form was denied because it was addressed to a vendor that was not on the approved vendor list for 2019. Prison officials stated that they had no record of receiving another form addressed to a different vendor. The record also showed that officials later offered Williams an expedited replacement order form, which he declined. During part of the relevant period, the purchase form contained three signature blocks, but after a March 14, 2019 memorandum, chaplain approval was no longer required and the process required two signatures.

RLUIPA claim

RLUIPA prohibits a state from substantially burdening an inmate’s religious exercise unless the burden is the least restrictive means of serving a compelling governmental interest. The court held that Williams had not produced evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the defendants substantially burdened his religious practice. The court relied on the January 23 clarification, the fact that the prison’s purchasing officer followed the existing matrix, and the later lifting of the vendor’s musk restrictions.

The court also noted that Williams testified that his faith did not require a particular musk scent. In the court’s view, any inconvenience was at most minimal and did not amount to a substantial burden under RLUIPA. The court found that Williams’s request for injunctive relief was moot because the matrix had not been revised and the purchasing process continued to allow religious oils and musks consistent with the existing rules. The court therefore granted judgment to the defendants on the RLUIPA claim.

First Amendment claim

For the Free Exercise claim, the court applied the rule that a prison restriction is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate prison interests. The court found that the temporary restrictions on certain musk scents had a reasonable connection to institutional safety and security because officials presented evidence that some musk products had been used to conceal or smuggle contraband.

The court also found that Williams had alternative ways to practice his religion, including access to Egyptian and Arabian musks and seven other religious oils. It concluded that the restrictions did not eliminate his ability to practice his faith, that the current process did not significantly affect guards or other inmates, and that the restrictions were not an exaggerated response to prison-security concerns. The court granted judgment to the defendants on the First Amendment claim.

Fourteenth Amendment claims

On equal protection, the court held that Williams had not shown that the defendants intentionally treated him differently from similarly situated inmates because of his religion. Williams testified that the issue was the officials’ refusal to process order forms, not his particular religion. The court found no evidence that similarly situated inmates were unable to purchase religious oils or musks allowed by the existing rules, and no evidence of discriminatory intent. It therefore granted judgment to the defendants on the Equal Protection claim.

On due process, the court recognized that formal changes to the Religious Personal Property Matrix had to follow California administrative rulemaking procedures. But it found that no such change occurred. The court also found that the defendants were not required to use those rulemaking procedures to change the facility’s purchasing-form process, and that Williams had access to the relevant departmental rules, forms, and approved-vendor list. The court concluded that Williams’s due process rights were not violated and granted judgment to the defendants on that claim.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The ruling resolved Williams’s remaining RLUIPA, First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process claims. The clerk was directed to terminate pending motions and close the file. The court stated that its ruling made it unnecessary to address the defendants’ alternative qualified-immunity argument.