Nasiri v. T.A.G. Security Protective Services Inc.

Background

Elias Nasiri moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 to alter or amend the judgment or, alternatively, for a new trial. The court held a jury trial on Nasiri’s individual federal and California labor claims against T.A.G. Security Protective Services, Inc.; Anthony Murga, doing business as T.A.G. Security Protective Services; and Gabriela Lopez. After Nasiri presented his evidence, the court granted judgment as a matter of law—a ruling that no reasonable jury could legally find for the opposing party—on the claims against Lopez and T.A.G. Security Protective Services, Inc.

The jury awarded Nasiri damages for unpaid overtime against Murga and found for Murga on the other claims. The court separately held a bench trial on Nasiri’s claims under the California Private Attorneys General Act, known as PAGA. The court dismissed all of those claims and awarded Nasiri $2,880 in statutory damages and $35.50 in liquidated damages for unpaid overtime. Judgment was entered on July 23, 2021.

Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment

The court explained that Rule 59(e) relief is an extraordinary remedy generally available for a serious legal or factual error, newly discovered evidence, manifest injustice, or an intervening change in controlling law. The court found that Nasiri had not shown circumstances warranting that relief.

First, the court upheld its dismissal of the claims against T.A.G. Security Protective Services, Inc. Although that entity had not filed an operative answer or been represented at trial, the court stated that the trial evidence controlled because the court had allowed the case to proceed to trial rather than entering a default judgment. The evidence showed that T.A.G. Security Protective Services, Inc. never employed Nasiri. The court concluded that a reasonable jury lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for Nasiri against that entity and that leaving the entity in the case could produce an inconsistent judgment with the dismissal of Lopez on the same evidence.

Second, the court rejected Nasiri’s argument that he had standing to pursue PAGA claims. The court stated that the issue was not whether Nasiri’s claims were time-barred. Instead, it concluded that he could not represent employees who worked after his employment with Murga or employees of T.A.G. Security Protective Services, Inc., which the court found had never employed him. The court also concluded that Nasiri was not an “aggrieved employee” for meal- and rest-break penalties because he had not personally suffered those alleged violations. The court therefore upheld its finding that Nasiri lacked PAGA standing.

Third, the court rejected Nasiri’s argument that the jury’s overtime verdict necessarily required an award for split-shift premiums. The court stated that Nasiri’s theory was not the only possible explanation for the overtime evidence and that the jury could have found his split-shift evidence unpersuasive, not credible, or difficult to understand while accepting other evidence supporting an overtime award. The court denied the request to add split-shift premiums to the judgment.

Fourth, the court ruled that Nasiri’s request to add T.A.G. Security Protective Services, Inc., Gabriela Lopez, and Tactical Advance Group, Inc. as successor judgment debtors was premature under California Labor Code section 200.3. That statute concerns liability by a successor to a judgment debtor after the appeal period has expired and no appeal is pending. Because Nasiri’s Rule 59 motions extended the time to appeal, the court stated that he could later file a noticed motion addressing successor status after the appeal period expired.

Motion for a New Trial

Nasiri alternatively sought a new trial on the split-shift-premium claim, arguing that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The court applied the standard requiring a new trial only when the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, based on false or perjured evidence, or necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. It found that the evidence did not compel the conclusion that Nasiri worked split shifts or that all of his overtime hours involved split shifts.

Ruling

The court denied Nasiri’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. It also denied Nasiri’s motion for a new trial and stated that the jury’s verdict in Murga’s favor on the split-shift claim was not contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.