Workman v. Saul

Background

Bobbi G. Workman brought this Social Security Act case under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to challenge the denial of disability insurance benefits. After Workman filed a motion for summary judgment, the parties agreed to send the case back for further administrative proceedings, and the court entered an order and judgment doing so. On remand, an administrative law judge found Workman disabled and entitled to benefits.

The Social Security Administration later awarded $65,633.60 in past-due benefits for April 2016 through September 2020. It withheld 25%, or $16,408.40, for attorney’s fees. Under a contingent-fee agreement, Workman agreed to pay her counsel up to 25% of any past-due benefits award. Counsel requested $16,407 under Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act. Workman did not object, and the Commissioner took no position on whether the requested amount was reasonable.

The court had previously awarded $3,824.40 in fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a statute that permits certain fee awards against the government. Counsel agreed to refund that earlier amount to Workman if the Section 406(b) request was granted.

Legal standard

Section 406(b) permits a court to award a reasonable fee for an attorney’s representation in court, up to 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits. The court must independently review a contingent-fee agreement to ensure that it produces a reasonable result. In doing so, it considers the quality of the representation, the results achieved, any delay or poor performance, whether the fee is excessive compared with the benefits obtained, and the risk counsel accepted by taking the case on a contingency basis.

The court may consider an hourly-rate calculation as an aid, but it should focus primarily on the contingent-fee agreement and the outcome of the representation. A Section 406(b) award also must be offset by any earlier Equal Access to Justice Act fee award, requiring counsel to refund the smaller amount to the claimant.

Analysis

The court found that the $16,407 request did not exceed 25% of Workman’s $65,633.60 award. It found no indication that counsel’s performance was substandard or that counsel delayed the case to increase the fee. Instead, counsel obtained a favorable result by helping Workman receive substantial past-due benefits.

Although counsel’s effective hourly rate appeared high, the court did not rely on that figure alone. It considered the contingent-fee agreement, the result achieved, the time spent, and the substantial risk that counsel would not be paid. Counsel had represented Workman on a contingency basis for four years, beginning after the Administration had denied her application, when counsel could not know whether the case would ultimately produce past-due benefits.

The court concluded that the requested fee would not give counsel an improper windfall and was reasonable. Because the Section 406(b) award exceeded the earlier Equal Access to Justice Act award, counsel was required to refund $3,824.40 to Workman.

Disposition

The court granted the motion for attorney’s fees. It awarded counsel $16,407 under Section 406(b) and ordered that $3,824.40 previously awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act be refunded to Workman. The order terminated Docket Number 23.