Barrett v. Brumfield

Background

Joseph Anthony Barrett, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed a self-represented action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reviewed the complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s screening requirement for prisoner lawsuits against governmental entities or employees. The court had separately allowed Barrett to proceed without paying the filing fee.

Barrett alleged that on December 23, 2018, correctional officers McClean, Faaita, Del Rosario, and Ramirez extracted him from his cell. He alleged that one or more officers struck his head with a baton, punched him, and deliberately dislocated his arm while he was on the ground. He alleged injuries including a dislocated left elbow, a broken left wrist, and scalp injuries requiring 10 staples. He also alleged that Robinson and Adamik supervised the extraction and that officers later reported that Barrett had assaulted them.

Barrett alleged that Davis knew about the events through prison procedures, did not act after Barrett filed a grievance, and was responsible for overseeing extraction procedures and investigating staff conduct. He alleged that Broomfield later became warden and continued the same extraction procedures.

Screening analysis and rulings

The court found a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim against McClean, Faaita, Del Rosario, and Ramirez. A claim is “cognizable” at this stage when the allegations are sufficient for the case to proceed past initial screening; it is not a final decision that the allegations are true.

The court did not find that Robinson and Adamik applied the force, so it did not allow an excessive-force claim against them on that basis. It did, however, find a cognizable Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference-to-inmate-safety claim against Robinson and Adamik based on their alleged supervision of the extraction. Deliberate indifference requires allegations that an official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate safety.

The court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claims against Broomfield with prejudice and ordered Broomfield terminated from the action. The court reasoned that Broomfield succeeded Davis as warden and could not be liable for events that occurred before Broomfield became a supervisor. “With prejudice” means the dismissed claims cannot be refiled in this action based on the same deficiency.

As to Davis, the court concluded that Davis could not be liable for excessive force because Davis did not apply the force. The court also found that Barrett had not adequately alleged a causal connection between Davis’s conduct and the alleged constitutional violation. The court expressly dismissed Davis’s Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference-to-safety claim with leave to amend. Barrett was given 28 days to file an amended complaint if he could truthfully correct the deficiency. The order did not state that the Davis claim was dismissed with or without prejudice.

Service and next steps ordered by the court

The court ordered service on McClean, Faaita, Del Rosario, Ramirez, Adamik, and S. Robinson through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s electronic-service program. It directed the defendants to file a motion for summary judgment or another dispositive motion within 91 days of the order, unless they informed the court that summary judgment could not resolve the case. Barrett’s opposition would be due 28 days after such a motion, and any reply would be due 14 days after the opposition. The court also authorized discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge and case status

Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. entered an order of partial service: some claims were allowed to proceed, one defendant was terminated, and one claim was dismissed with leave to amend. The order was a screening and case-management ruling, not a final decision on whether the alleged constitutional violations occurred.