Poston v. Spearman

Background

Donel Poston filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state conviction and sentence. One claim alleges a violation of Brady v. Maryland, the rule requiring the government to disclose material evidence favorable to the defense, including evidence useful for impeaching a prosecution witness. Poston specifically alleged that Lieutenant Tony Jones, who testified as a prosecution expert, had sent racist text messages to another officer.

The district court had previously ordered Respondent’s counsel to obtain and provide evidence relevant to when the prosecution discovered, or had a duty to discover, the messages. It also allowed supplemental briefing on whether the prosecution had a duty to disclose them. The district court referred the discovery dispute to the magistrate judge.

Discovery request and ruling

Poston served a request for production under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34. He sought records concerning racist or racially charged text messages sent by Jones; investigations into those messages or other allegedly racist conduct; complaints against Jones; and lawsuits involving such conduct.

Respondent argued that no discovery was warranted because the prosecution was not aware of racist text messages before Poston was sentenced. The court rejected that reasoning for purposes of this discovery request. It explained that evidence may be relevant to the government’s disclosure duties even when the prosecutor personally did not possess or know about it, if it was known to government investigators or other government personnel. The court noted that Jones, as a testifying expert for the prosecution, arguably had an obligation to disclose his own racist text messages if they existed before the relevant time.

The court therefore directed Respondent to investigate whether the Oakland Police Department has evidence that Jones sent arguably racist text messages before Poston’s sentencing. The court identified Jones’s personnel file and investigative records as possible locations for such evidence. If evidence of messages created before sentencing is found, Respondent must produce it to Poston within 21 days of the order. The court emphasized that the question was whether evidence showed that the messages existed, not merely whether the District Attorney knew about them before sentencing.

The court did not order any other discovery because Poston had not shown a basis for a good-faith belief that the additional discovery he requested exists. The order disposed of Docket No. 36. It resolved the discovery issue only; it did not decide the ultimate merits of Poston’s Brady claim.