Taylor v. Google LLC

Background

Joseph Taylor, Edward Mlakar, Mick Cleary, and Eugene Alvis sued Google LLC individually and on behalf of a proposed class of people in the United States, excluding California residents, who used Android devices to access the internet through cellular data plans. They alleged that Google designed Android and Google applications to make “passive” data transfers without users’ knowledge or consent, including when devices or applications were idle or closed.

The plaintiffs claimed that they had property interests in the cellular data allowances they purchased from mobile carriers. They alleged that Google’s transfers used those allowances for Google’s product development and targeted advertising. The complaint asserted claims for conversion and quantum meruit and sought an injunction, the value of the cellular data allegedly used, the reasonable value of the data used to benefit Google, and fees and costs.

Google moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Rule 12(b)(1) motion argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not alleged a concrete injury. The Rule 12(b)(6) motion argued that the conversion claim did not identify a legally recognized property interest, wrongful interference, or damages, and that the quantum meruit claim was derivative of the conversion claim.

Standing

The court treated Google’s standing challenge as a facial challenge, meaning it considered whether the complaint’s allegations were sufficient on their face to establish federal jurisdiction. The court explained that each named plaintiff had to allege a personal, concrete injury rather than rely on possible injuries to other class members.

The court noted that the complaint did not allege that Alvis had been charged an overage fee under a limited data plan. It also did not allege that any plaintiff with an unlimited plan was subject to a usage quota or had experienced reduced connection speeds. The court rejected the argument that a request for Google’s profits, by itself, established standing.

The court connected the standing question to the plaintiffs’ claim that their cellular data allowances were property. It concluded that the plaintiffs did not have a property interest in their cellular data allowances that was harmed by Google’s alleged conduct and therefore did not state a conversion or quantum meruit claim.

Conversion claim

Under California law, conversion requires ownership or a right to possess property, wrongful disposition of that property right, and damages. The court applied the rule that a claimed property interest must be precisely definable, capable of exclusive possession or control, and supported by a legitimate claim of exclusivity.

The court assumed without deciding that the plaintiffs’ claimed interest was precisely defined. It nevertheless concluded that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged exclusive possession of specific bytes of cellular data. In the court’s view, their data plans gave them a contractual right to access a carrier’s network, not ownership or control of particular data bytes. That access was available to other subscribers as well.

The court found the plaintiffs’ comparisons to water, natural gas, electricity, apples, credit-card charges, television programming, and telephone access codes unpersuasive. Unlike those examples, the allegations did not show that Google’s use of the network consumed a specific item that the plaintiffs exclusively possessed or that the plaintiffs’ network access was diminished through overage charges, throttled speeds, or another alleged effect.

The court therefore granted Google’s motion to dismiss the conversion claim because the complaint did not allege that the cellular data allowances were personal property capable of exclusive possession or control. It did not reach the remaining conversion requirements.

Quantum meruit claim

Quantum meruit is a simplified form of pleading generally used to seek payment or restitution. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ quantum meruit claim was based on the same facts as the conversion claim, incorporated the earlier allegations, and sought essentially the same monetary recovery. Because the conversion claim was dismissed, the derivative quantum meruit theory also had to be dismissed.

The plaintiffs separately pointed to an alleged right to recover the reasonable value of personal information that Google collected and used. The court found that the complaint provided almost no factual detail about what information was involved, how Google used it, or why the plaintiffs were entitled to relief. The court therefore granted Google’s motion to dismiss the quantum meruit claim.

Leave to amend and disposition

The court allowed amendment of the conversion claim even though the plaintiffs had not identified additional facts that would support it. The court also allowed amendment of the quantum meruit claim to the extent the plaintiffs could plausibly base it on their cellular data allowances. The court did not allow amendment of the quantum meruit theory based on alleged use of personal information because the plaintiffs had not identified additional facts or explained why those allegations were omitted from the original complaint.

The order granted Google’s motion to dismiss the complaint with leave to amend the conversion and quantum meruit claims consistent with the order. The amended complaint was due by October 18, 2021. Because this was a Rule 12 jurisdictional and pleading ruling, the classification is procedural_order under the stated convention, even though the court analyzed the alleged property interest in detail.