Singleton v. Neuschmid

Background

Terrence M. Singleton sought federal relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from his California convictions. A San Francisco Superior Court jury convicted him in 2015 of two counts of second-degree robbery and found true an allegation that he had a prior felony conviction. The court imposed a 13-year sentence in 2016. His direct appeals were unsuccessful. The opinion states that he appears not to have pursued state collateral relief.

The robberies occurred at a San Francisco gas station in December 2013. Singleton and codefendants Dishon Irving and Derek Gould took property from two customers. Police later located Gould’s silver car. Singleton exited the passenger side and ran when he saw police. A search of the car found property belonging to the victims, two hidden handguns, and several cell phones. The victims appeared fearful when brought near the defendants for possible identification, and recordings of jail telephone calls contained implied threats toward people who cooperated with law enforcement.

Claims and legal standards

Singleton challenged the convictions on four grounds: (1) insufficient evidence of force or fear; (2) insufficient evidence that he was one of the perpetrators; (3) insufficient evidence that he constructively possessed the stolen property; and (4) insufficient evidence to support a jury instruction permitting an inference from possession of recently stolen property.

For the evidence claims, the court applied the rule that a conviction must be upheld if, viewing the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, any rational factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the federal habeas statute and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the federal court also had to defer to the state court unless its decision contradicted clearly established United States Supreme Court law, unreasonably applied that law, or rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

For the jury-instruction claim, the court explained that a petitioner must show that an improper instruction infected the entire trial so seriously that the conviction violated due process. The instruction had to be considered in the context of the complete set of instructions and the trial record.

Analysis

Force or fear. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to show that the property was taken through fear, even though there was no evidence of physical force. One victim said he feared that he and the other victim would be killed. Officers described the victims as angry, shaken, fearful, shocked, agitated, or visibly distressed. The court concluded that this evidence supported finding that the victims surrendered their property because they feared unlawful injury. It also deferred to the jury’s decision to credit the prosecution’s evidence and reject Singleton’s position. The claim was denied.

Identity. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Singleton was one of the perpetrators. He was apprehended after leaving a vehicle containing stolen property, attempted to flee when he saw officers, had been with Gould and Irving before and after the robbery, and was with Irving during an unsuccessful attempt to use a victim’s ATM card. The court found that the state court’s rejection of the claim was reasonable and entitled to deference. The claim was denied.

Constructive possession. Constructive possession means having control over property, or a sufficient connection to it, without necessarily holding it physically. The court rejected Singleton’s argument that there was insufficient evidence of constructive possession. It relied on the fact that he had just exited a vehicle filled with stolen items and on his connection with the other participants and their shared criminal activity. The court found the state court’s decision reasonable under the federal habeas standard. The claim was denied.

Jury instruction. The trial court gave an instruction stating that possession of recently stolen property, combined with slight supporting evidence, could support a conclusion that the defendant committed robbery, but that the jury could not convict unless every essential fact was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The federal court held that the evidence of Singleton’s possession was sufficient to support the instruction. It also noted that another instruction told jurors to apply instructions only after deciding what facts had been proved, and that jurors are presumed to follow instructions. The court concluded that giving the instruction did not violate due process. The claim was denied.

Disposition

Judge William H. Orrick concluded that the state courts had not acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law, and had not made an unreasonable determination of the facts. The petition was denied. The court stated that a certificate of appealability would not issue, although Singleton could seek one from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Clerk was directed to enter judgment for the respondent and close the file.