Court, Explained
U.S. Federal District Courts
Back to docket
N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Oct. 15, 2021

Shijin Vapor LLC v. Bolt USA, LLC

Judge
Phyllis Hamilton
Docket
4:20-cv-05238
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
3
DiscoveryCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Shijin Vapor v. Bolt USA, Judge Hamilton denied a deposition of opposing counsel, granted a request to cancel it, and extended fact discovery.

Who this affects

Shijin Vapor LLC and Bolt USA, LLC, particularly their corporate representatives and Bolt’s trial counsel, Nicholas Myers.

What happened

Shijin Vapor LLC and Bolt USA, LLC asked the court to resolve a discovery dispute involving Shijin Vapor’s notice to depose Bolt’s trial counsel, Nicholas Myers. Shijin Vapor claimed the deposition was justified by alleged false statements about trademark applications, while Bolt argued the information could be obtained in less burdensome ways.

The court applied a three-part test requiring Shijin Vapor to show that no other way existed to obtain the information, that the information was relevant and not protected, and that it was crucial to the case. The court found that Shijin Vapor had not shown that other methods were unavailable, denied the request to depose Myers, and granted Bolt’s request to cancel the deposition notice.

Judge Hamilton allowed Shijin Vapor to seek the deposition again after the corporate representatives’ depositions if it could satisfy the test. She extended fact discovery to October 28, 2021, ordered both parties to make their corporate representatives available, and declined to consider a request to disqualify Myers because it was premature.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Shijin Vapor LLC v. Bolt USA, LLC · No. 4:20-cv-05238
Judge
Phyllis Hamilton
Date
Oct. 15, 2021

Background

The parties submitted a joint letter brief about a discovery dispute. The dispute primarily concerned Shijin Vapor’s notice to depose Nicholas Myers, Bolt’s trial counsel. Shijin Vapor argued that the deposition was warranted because Bolt allegedly engaged in fraud when submitting trademark applications relevant to the lawsuit and because Myers allegedly made false statements connected to those applications. Bolt argued that deposing trial counsel was improper when the information could be obtained through other means and asked the court to quash, or cancel, the deposition notice.

The dispute also affected the parties’ depositions of their corporate representatives. Bolt did not appear for its noticed deposition under Rule 30(b)(6), which allows a party to designate an organizational representative to testify. Shijin Vapor stated that it would produce its own Rule 30(b)(6) witness only after Myers’s deposition.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the three-part test from Shelton v. American Motors Corp., which courts in the district had used for depositions of opposing counsel. Under that test, a party seeking to depose opposing counsel must show that: (1) no other means exist to obtain the information; (2) the information is relevant and not protected by privilege; and (3) the information is crucial to preparing the case.

The court held that Shijin Vapor had not shown a sufficient basis for deposing Myers. In particular, Shijin Vapor had not shown that no other means existed to obtain the information. Shijin Vapor acknowledged that it might obtain discovery by deposing Bolt. The court also noted that Shijin Vapor had not served interrogatories or used other methods to obtain the information from Myers and had noticed the deposition less than two weeks before the close of discovery.

Ruling

The court denied the request to depose Myers and granted Bolt’s request to quash the deposition notice. The ruling was without prejudice to Shijin Vapor seeking to depose Myers later if, after deposing Bolt’s corporate representative, Shijin Vapor could satisfy the three-part test. The court said any renewed request would require a non-conclusory, non-privileged factual basis and a showing that no other means existed to obtain the information.

The court also found Shijin Vapor’s request for permission to file a motion to disqualify Myers premature and stated that it would not consider that request unless Shijin Vapor first showed that Myers’s testimony was crucial to the case. The court extended the close of fact discovery to October 28, 2021, directed both parties to make their Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses available for deposition, and required a further joint letter brief within seven days after the close of fact discovery if the parties could not agree about whether the Shelton test was satisfied.

The authoritative version

Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
Summary written with AI assistance. See how summaries are made. Spot something wrong? Tell us.