Cornejo v. Tumlin

Background

The case concerns the towing of Marimar Cornejo and Jamil Bey’s 1998 Toyota Camry in February 2020. The plaintiffs represented themselves. After an earlier order dismissed some claims and allowed amendment of their Fourth Amendment claims against Alvah and PG&E, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. The defendants then filed four motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim.

The earlier order had dismissed with prejudice the state-law claims, the Fourth Amendment claim against the City and County of San Francisco, the Fourteenth Amendment claim against all defendants, and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against AutoReturn, Alvah, and PG&E. It dismissed the Fourth Amendment claims against Alvah and PG&E without prejudice and allowed amendment. It did not dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim against AutoReturn or the Eighth Amendment claim against AutoReturn and the City and County.

City and County of San Francisco’s Motion

The court granted the motion as to the Fourth Amendment claim against the City and County because the earlier order had already dismissed that claim with prejudice, and res judicata barred bringing the same claim against the same defendants again.

The court denied the motion as to Jeffrey Tumlin. Although the complaint’s caption identified Tumlin in his official capacity, other allegations named him in both his individual and official capacities and alleged that he ratified the challenged conduct. The court therefore rejected the argument that the case against Tumlin was only a suit against the City.

The court granted the motion as to the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency. It held that the agency was not an independent public corporation with the power to sue or be sued and was not a proper defendant in the case.

AutoReturn’s Motion

AutoReturn moved to dismiss the Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims. The court denied the motion.

For the Fourth Amendment claim, AutoReturn argued that it was a private company and not a state actor, meaning an entity whose conduct can be treated as government action for purposes of a civil-rights claim under § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that AutoReturn acted jointly with the City and County, was authorized to seize vehicles on the City and County’s behalf, and routinely towed vehicles for the City and County. Relying on Ninth Circuit authority concerning private towing companies acting at the direction of law enforcement or under a state enforcement scheme, the court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged AutoReturn was a state actor.

For the Eighth Amendment claim, AutoReturn argued that California law limited storage charges and that the total lawful charge was much lower than the amount listed on its website. The court rejected that argument at the pleading stage. It held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that AutoReturn charged sums exceeding the legal protections it invoked, and therefore stated an Eighth Amendment claim based on excessive fees.

Alvah’s Motion

Alvah moved to dismiss, arguing that it was not a state actor, that the plaintiffs might lack standing, and that the complaint did not adequately allege individual liability against Cameron Hale, Alvah’s chief executive officer.

The court granted the motion. It held that the plaintiffs’ allegations did not plausibly show state action under the applicable nexus, joint-action, or public-function tests. Alvah performed construction work and posted or failed to properly post no-parking signs, but did not itself cite or tow the vehicle and did not exercise the government’s exclusive powers. A permit and the ability to alert transportation officials about illegally parked vehicles were not enough to establish state action.

The court rejected the standing argument. Although the complaint did not expressly state that the plaintiffs owned the vehicle, its references to “our seized automobile” and “the deprivation of our property” supported a reasonable inference that they had an ownership or possessory interest.

The court nevertheless held that the complaint failed to state a claim against Hale. It alleged that Hale’s secretary sent the plaintiffs an intemperate email and that Hale thereby ratified an unconstitutional act, but it did not allege that Hale participated in, authorized, or directed the alleged wrongdoing. The court also stated that private parties acting under color of state law cannot be held liable solely because of their supervisory corporate positions.

PG&E’s Motion

The court granted PG&E’s motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim. It found that PG&E’s alleged role was substantially the same as Alvah’s. PG&E’s authority to place no-parking signs and call the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency when vehicles were parked in the work area did not amount to police power or otherwise make PG&E a state actor. The court concluded that none of the relevant state-action tests was satisfied.

Disposition

The court granted the City and County of San Francisco’s motion as to the Fourth Amendment claim and all claims against the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, and denied that motion as to Tumlin. It denied AutoReturn’s motion, granted Alvah’s motion, and granted PG&E’s motion. The order states that all dismissed claims were dismissed with prejudice. Judge Charles R. Breyer also vacated the scheduled hearing and resolved the motions without oral argument.