Barnett v. Garrigan
- Vince Chhabria
- 3:20-cv-02585
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 2
In Barnett v. Garrigan, Judge Chhabria denied defendants’ sanctions motion, denied monetary sanctions, and denied additional evidence objections without prejudice.
The ruling affected the plaintiffs’ ability to use Pfeffer as a witness and the defendants’ requests for evidentiary and monetary sanctions; the defendants may renew their additional evidentiary objections later.
What happened
In Barnett v. Garrigan, the defendants asked the court to impose sanctions because the plaintiffs did not properly identify Pfeffer as a witness during discovery. The opinion says the plaintiffs’ second response to the sanctions motion was not considered.
The court found the disclosure failure harmless because discovery had been reopened so defendants could depose Pfeffer, and the parties indicated that the deposition would occur. The court also found no willfulness, fault, or bad faith, noting that Pfeffer’s relevance had been apparent from the plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
Judge Chhabria denied the defendants’ motion for sanctions and denied their request for monetary sanctions. He also denied the defendants’ additional objections to evidence without prejudice, allowing them to raise those objections again in a later dispositive motion, motions to exclude evidence before trial, or at trial.
The detailed version
- Barnett v. Garrigan · No. 3:20-cv-02585
- Vince Chhabria
- Oct. 19, 2021
Background
The defendants moved for evidentiary sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to properly disclose Pfeffer as a witness under the disclosure requirements in Rule 26. The court noted that the plaintiffs’ second response opposing the motion was not considered.
Court’s Analysis
Rule 37(c)(1) generally prevents a party from using information or a witness that was not properly disclosed, unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless. The court explained that relevant factors include prejudice or surprise, the ability to cure any prejudice, possible disruption of trial, and whether the failure involved bad faith or intentional conduct.
The court found that the plaintiffs’ failure to disclose Pfeffer was harmless because it had recently reopened discovery for the limited purpose of allowing the defendants to depose Pfeffer, and the parties had indicated that the deposition would take place. The court also stated that excluding Pfeffer’s testimony would seriously damage the plaintiffs’ case. It found no willfulness, fault, or bad faith because the plaintiffs had not hidden Pfeffer’s existence or relevance; her role had been apparent from at least the second amended complaint, which alleged that the defendants had notice of mold through statements made by Pfeffer. The complaint’s reference to Pfeffer was not an adequate Rule 26 disclosure, but the court viewed the failure as a good-faith error.
Rulings
The court denied the defendants’ motion for sanctions. It separately denied the defendants’ request for monetary sanctions because the disclosure failure was harmless and monetary sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1)(A) were therefore not warranted. The court also denied the defendants’ additional evidentiary objections without prejudice. The defendants may raise those objections again in a later dispositive motion, in motions in limine, or at trial.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.