Stuckey v. California Departmnet of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Background

Andre Kenneth Stuckey, a state prisoner incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while representing himself. He alleged that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. His allegations concerned COVID-19 testing and contact tracing, the conditions of the prison’s medical-isolation unit, and the denial of daily mental-health checks during a 15-day period. The court’s earlier order had allowed certain Eighth Amendment claims to proceed and had dismissed other claims or defendants.

Stuckey had previously received permission to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, a status commonly called proceeding in forma pauperis, or IFP. Defendants moved to revoke that status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s “three strikes” rule. That rule generally prevents a prisoner from proceeding IFP after three prior federal actions or appeals were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim, unless the prisoner was under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Three-Strikes Analysis

The court granted defendants’ request for judicial notice of documents from three earlier cases. It determined that the dismissals in Case Nos. 2:12-cv-06875, 2:12-cv-08438, and 19-cv-03688 qualified as strikes under § 1915(g). Stuckey argued that two of the earlier cases should not count because they involved the same operative facts, but the court held that the statute contains no exception for duplicate litigation.

The court then considered whether Stuckey qualified for the imminent-danger exception. Stuckey alleged that defendants had been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, mental health, and safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. He submitted a declaration from a Pelican Bay physician stating that Stuckey had more than one documented medical diagnosis placing him at high risk for a severe or fatal outcome if infected with the virus causing COVID-19.

The court concluded that Stuckey plausibly alleged an imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed the complaint. It also found the required connection between the alleged danger and his claims concerning defendants’ failure to protect him from the COVID-19 pandemic. Because Stuckey qualified for the exception, the court denied defendants’ motion to revoke his IFP status.

Other Motions and Case Schedule

The court granted Stuckey leave to file his surreply and denied defendants’ motion to strike it. It denied Stuckey’s motion for appointment of counsel because he had not shown exceptional circumstances; the court stated that this denial was without prejudice to a possible future appointment if circumstances warranted one.

Because Stuckey had filed both an amended-complaint motion and a supplemental-complaint motion, the court considered only the more recent supplemental-complaint motion. It denied the motion to amend as moot. The court did not yet rule on the supplemental-complaint motion. Instead, it directed defendants to respond within 14 days, after which the court would decide that motion.

The court also set a schedule for the case. Defendants were directed to file a summary-judgment motion or another dispositive motion no later than 60 days after their answer was due, unless they informed the court that summary judgment could not resolve the case. Stuckey’s opposition would be due 28 days after the motion, and defendants’ reply would be due 14 days after the opposition. The court authorized discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and allowed defendants to depose Stuckey and other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

Disposition

The order denied defendants’ motion to revoke Stuckey’s IFP status; denied Stuckey’s motion for appointed counsel; denied as moot his motion for leave to file an amended complaint; granted his request to file a surreply; denied defendants’ motion to strike the surreply; and deferred a ruling on the motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint until after defendants responded. The order addressed procedure and access to the case rather than deciding whether Stuckey’s underlying civil-rights claims were proven.