Reed v. City of Emeryville

Background

Jon Reed, Laura Berry, Frank Eugene Moore, III, Gabriel Smithson, and organizational plaintiff Where Do We Go Berkeley (WDWGB) sued the City of Emeryville and Christine Daniel, the City Manager. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants removed the individuals from the Shellmound Encampment without offering housing appropriate for their mental-health disabilities. They asserted two state-created-danger claims—one under the Fourteenth Amendment through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and one under the California Constitution—and a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against the City.

The plaintiffs alleged that the City’s homelessness program, operated through Operation Dignity, was inaccessible to people with disabilities. They specifically alleged that the only shelter option offered by the City, an overnight shelter at St. Vincent de Paul, was unsuitable for people with mental-health disabilities. They also alleged that the organization had diverted resources to help the individuals move, provide supplies, and pay for hotel rooms.

Standing and mootness

The defendants argued that the constitutional claims were moot because the individuals had left the encampment after earlier court orders and that WDWGB lacked standing. Standing is the legal requirement that a plaintiff show an injury connected to the defendant’s conduct that a court can likely remedy.

The court held that WDWGB plausibly alleged an injury because it diverted resources, including funds for hotel rooms, that it otherwise would have used for its mission. The court also held that the individual plaintiffs’ claims were not moot. Although the court had issued orders setting a deadline for leaving the encampment, the City had begun the process by posting a notice requiring residents to remove themselves and their belongings. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could still seek damages for the City’s conduct.

Daniel and the state-created-danger claims

The court held that Daniel was plausibly alleged to have been involved in the City’s decision to post the eviction notice. But the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that Daniel personally took action that placed them in a state-created danger or was deliberately indifferent to such conduct. The court dismissed Daniel’s official-capacity claim with prejudice because the plaintiffs sought no injunctive relief on the state-created-danger claims and an official-capacity claim would provide only a potential basis for injunctive relief in this case.

The court also rejected the state-created-danger claims against Daniel and the City. A state-created-danger claim requires plausible allegations that government action affirmatively exposed a person to a known or obvious danger that the person would not otherwise have faced, with deliberate indifference to that danger. The court relied on facts established in the earlier temporary-restraining-order proceedings: the City offered the plaintiffs shelter beds at St. Vincent de Paul, and the encampment was unsafe because it was next to an active construction site.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not plausibly allege that the defendants placed them in a more dangerous situation than they had been in. The court therefore dismissed the state-created-danger claims under both § 1983 and the California Constitution with prejudice. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ municipal-liability theory, known as a Monell claim, because the state-created-danger claims failed as a matter of law.

ADA claim

Title II of the ADA generally prohibits a public entity from excluding a qualified person with a disability from its services, programs, or activities, or denying that person their benefits because of the disability. The plaintiffs alleged that the City failed to provide reasonable modifications to its homelessness program, including accessible shelter options and changes to how outreach services were provided.

The court held that the individual plaintiffs plausibly alleged a Title II ADA claim. It explained that whether proposed changes—such as quieter or separated spaces within an existing shelter—would be reasonable accommodations or would fundamentally alter the City’s program could not be decided from the pleadings alone. The court also rejected, on the record before it, the City’s argument that it could not be responsible for ADA compliance because it contracted with service providers.

The court held that WDWGB had alleged an injury sufficient for standing but had not alleged that the individual plaintiffs were its members, an allegation needed for its associational-standing theory. The court dismissed WDWGB’s Title II claim with leave to amend and gave plaintiffs 20 days to address that defect.

Disposition

The defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted with respect to Daniel and the state-created-danger claims. It was denied with respect to the individual plaintiffs’ ADA claim and granted with leave to amend with respect to WDWGB’s associational-standing allegations. The case was not otherwise terminated by this order.