Jones v. DeJoy

Background

Kyung Sook Jones sued Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (Pacific Area) Agency. She alleges race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791.

Jones moved for appointment of counsel so she could present the facts of her claims. She said that she had tried hard to find a lawyer, that repeatedly explaining her situation had been exhausting and distressing, and that she had been unable to work since August 26, 2020 because of work-related injuries. She reported approximately $27,600 in personal income and approximately $67,600 in combined household income for 2020. The opinion states that her household income was based on her husband’s retirement pension, which appeared to be approximately $40,000 that year.

The court also discussed Jones’s earlier related case. In that case, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all claims except retaliation. After a trial at which Jones represented herself, the court found for the defendant on the remaining claim. The court had appointed counsel for a limited purpose during that earlier case but had denied another request for appointed counsel.

Legal standard

The court explained that employment-discrimination plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel. Title VII nevertheless allows a court, in appropriate circumstances, to appoint an attorney. The court applied three factors: (1) the plaintiff’s financial resources, (2) the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain counsel, and (3) whether the claims have merit.

Court’s analysis

Regarding financial resources, the court noted that Jones had paid the filing fee and was not proceeding without paying court costs because of financial hardship. Although the court recognized that attorney’s fees can be expensive and acknowledged Jones’s statements that she had not worked since August 26, 2020 and had exhausted her leave, it did not find that this factor required appointment of counsel.

Regarding efforts to obtain counsel, the court found that Jones had explained her search for legal assistance only at a high level and had provided no further detail. The court understood that searching for counsel could be exhausting, but concluded that this alone was not a reason to appoint counsel. The opinion also notes that Jones did not say whether she discussed contingent-fee arrangements with the lawyers she contacted.

Regarding the merits, the court said it could not conclude at that stage that Jones’s claims were likely to succeed. It identified a substantial question about whether she had properly completed the required administrative process before bringing her claims. It also relied on the weakness of her similar earlier case, in which only one claim survived summary judgment and Jones ultimately prevailed on none of her claims. The court found that this factor weighed against appointing counsel.

Disposition

Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. denied Jones’s motion to appoint counsel without prejudice. The order states that the court could appoint counsel later on its own if changed circumstances warranted that action.