Seaplane Adventures, LLC v. County of Marin, California

Background

Seaplane challenged Marin County’s COVID-19 health order. The order prohibited two of Seaplane’s operations: recreational sightseeing flights and charter flights for leisure travel. It allowed transportation for essential activities and other operations, including fire spotting and cargo transport. A prior order had granted summary judgment to the County on Seaplane’s equal-protection and related claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute allowing suits against state actors for violating federal rights. This order addressed the separate preemption question.

The Federal Aviation Administration declined to provide its view because the health order was no longer in effect. The County argued that the preemption issue was moot and that its police power allowed the restrictions. Seaplane argued that the order might be reinstated because the County had amended it four times during the pandemic and conditions could change. The court found a sufficient likelihood of reinstatement to consider the preemption issue.

Conflict Preemption

Conflict preemption applies when state or local law either makes compliance with federal law physically impossible or obstructs federal objectives. The court found that the health order did not force Seaplane to violate aviation safety standards or another federal rule. Seaplane had no federal-law obligation to provide the recreational flights prohibited by the order.

The court then considered Section 41713(b)(1) of the Airline Deregulation Act. That provision prevents a state or local government from enacting or enforcing a law related to an air carrier’s “price, route, or service.” Seaplane had an air-carrier certificate and was registered as an air-taxi operator, so the provision applied to it.

The court held that Section 41713(b)(1) did not preempt the sightseeing-flight restriction. Sightseeing flights began and ended at the same location and therefore were not a “route” or “service” in the public-utility sense used by the statute. The court also found no other federal-law conflict with the sightseeing prohibition.

The court reached a different conclusion about charter flights carrying passengers to another destination or bringing them from another location. The County’s restriction limited the routes and services Seaplane could offer by allowing charter flights only for essential travel. The court held that this restriction was preempted, even though the County’s public-health goal was reasonable, because the federal law contained no public-health exception. The court stated that the result applied to both intrastate and interstate travel and regardless of the passengers’ reasons for traveling.

Field Preemption

Field preemption occurs when federal regulation is so comprehensive in a particular area that it leaves no room for state or local regulation in that field. The court defined the relevant field narrowly as aviation-related restrictions during a public-health emergency.

The court held that federal aviation law had not occupied that field. Federal legislation and Federal Aviation Administration responses during the COVID-19 pandemic did not show that Congress or the agency had comprehensively regulated public-health restrictions affecting aviation. Nonbinding Federal Aviation Administration guidance also supported local authority to limit recreational aviation activities. The court therefore concluded that field preemption did not invalidate the sightseeing-flight prohibition.

Damages

Seaplane argued that it could recover $1 million under Section 1983 because the County had enforced a preempted health order. The court ruled that damages were unavailable under that theory. To support a Section 1983 claim based on a federal statute, a plaintiff must show that the statute creates a federal right. The court applied the three-part test requiring congressional intent to benefit the plaintiff, a sufficiently clear right, and a binding obligation on the states.

The court held that Section 41713(b)(1) did not create an enforceable federal right because it was written as a restriction on state authority, not as a rights-granting provision for air carriers. Because the first requirement was not met, the court did not address the other two requirements.

Disposition

The court concluded that federal law did not restrict the County’s ability to prohibit recreational sightseeing flights during the COVID-19 pandemic. It held that federal law did preempt the prohibition on charter flights transporting passengers to or from other locations. Declaratory relief was warranted only to that extent, in the event the County reinstated the health order. The court also ruled that damages were not recoverable. The opinion states that final judgment would be entered separately.