Thornton v. City & County of San Francisco

Background

Cheryl Thornton had worked for the City & County of San Francisco (CCSF) for nearly 30 years. She filed an earlier lawsuit against CCSF that the parties settled in 2020. The settlement agreement released claims and liabilities related to her employment that existed through the date she signed the agreement, and it stated that it would not become effective or enforceable until the seven-day revocation period expired. The opinion refers to March 3, 2020, as the operative date, while noting that the parties also referred to February 24, 2020, the signing date.

Thornton later filed an eleven-claim federal complaint alleging, among other things, racial and age discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The complaint described events before and after the settlement’s operative date. The pre-settlement allegations included denials of promotions and training opportunities in 2019, as well as other workplace events. The post-settlement allegations included claims involving work assignments, complaints about patient screening conditions, a transfer, reprimands, a performance appraisal, and the denial of overtime and supervisory opportunities.

Motion and Legal Standards

CCSF moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) and moved to strike under Rule 12(f). A judgment-on-the-pleadings motion is decided from the pleadings and may be granted when, taking the allegations as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court treats this type of motion in essentially the same way as a motion to dismiss. A motion to strike can remove redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous material, but the court stated that striking is generally improper unless the challenged matter could have no possible bearing on the case or would unduly prejudice the opposing party.

The court noted that CCSF’s motion to strike was filed after the deadline in Rule 12(f)(2). It nevertheless considered the request because Rule 12(f)(1) allows a court to strike material on its own.

Ruling

The court held that the settlement barred the portions of Thornton’s claims that relied solely on the 2019 denials of training and promotions. The court identified those allegations as components of Claims One, Four, Six, and Ten, involving racial discrimination, retaliation, age discrimination, employment discrimination, and retaliation under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. The court emphasized that it was not striking or dismissing those claims in their entirety. Instead, it granted judgment on the pleadings as to the components based solely on the pre-settlement denials of training and promotion.

The court declined to strike paragraphs 20 through 30 and paragraph 33 of the complaint. Those paragraphs contained the underlying factual allegations, and the court found they could have an evidentiary or background role in supporting claims based on later conduct. The court therefore denied the request to strike those paragraphs, while stating that the ruling was without prejudice to CCSF’s ability to challenge or limit their use as evidence in later proceedings.

In conclusion, Judge Susan Illston granted in part CCSF’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or motion to strike.