Austin v. Lyft, Inc.
- Maxine Chesney
- 3:21-cv-09345
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In Austin v. Lyft, Judge Spero ordered Austin to explain why his default-judgment motion should not be denied because default was not entered and service appeared improper.
George Jarvis Austin’s motion for default judgment and Lyft, Inc.’s response and service obligations.
What happened
In Austin v. Lyft, George Jarvis Austin asked the court to enter a judgment because Lyft, Inc. had not responded. The court found problems with the request.
The court said the clerk had not entered Lyft’s default, which must happen before a party asks for a default judgment. It also said Austin’s request appeared premature because Lyft’s response deadline had not yet passed. In addition, the court said service by certified mail appeared improper under the federal rules and California law.
The court did not yet deny the motion. It gave Austin until December 27, 2021, to withdraw it or explain why it should not be denied. Judge Spero also said that, if Austin did not withdraw the motion, the case would be reassigned to a district judge with a recommendation about the motion.
The detailed version
- Austin v. Lyft, Inc. · No. 3:21-cv-09345
- Maxine Chesney
- Dec. 13, 2021
Background
George Jarvis Austin filed a motion for default judgment against Lyft, Inc. A default judgment is a judgment entered when a defendant has failed to respond after being properly served. The court issued an order requiring Austin to show why the motion should not be denied.
Problems with the Motion
The court identified two problems with Austin’s request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. First, the clerk had not entered Lyft’s default under Rule 55(a). The court explained that this clerk entry is required before a party may seek default judgment under Rule 55(b), and that any request for entry of default should be made to the clerk’s office.
Second, if Austin was seeking entry of default rather than default judgment, the request was premature. Austin acknowledged in the motion that Lyft’s deadline to respond would not have passed until January 13, 2022.
Service of Process
The court also found that the complaint appeared to have been served by certified mail. Under Rule 4(h), a corporation may be served through methods allowed for individuals under Rule 4(e), or by delivering the summons and complaint to an appropriate officer or agent. The court stated that courts have uniformly rejected treating mailing as “delivering” under the federal rule.
The court further explained that California law permits service by mail only when specific requirements are met, including a notice of acknowledgment and a signed acknowledgment returned by the recipient. The order said there was no indication those requirements were satisfied. It also concluded that certified-mail service did not satisfy the other federal service methods requiring personal delivery, delivery to an authorized agent, or leaving the documents at a dwelling with a suitable resident.
Order
The court did not enter default or deny the motion at this stage. It allowed Austin either to withdraw the motion or to file a response addressing why the motion should not be denied by December 27, 2021. Because the magistrate judge did not have the consent of all parties to handle the case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the order stated that the case would be reassigned to a district judge with a recommendation about the motion if Austin did not withdraw it. Judge Joseph C. Spero signed the order as the undersigned magistrate judge.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.