Tony N. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services

Background

The five plaintiffs had applied for asylum and received employment authorization documents allowing them to work for two years while their asylum applications were pending. Each applied to renew an employment authorization document before it expired. Under the applicable regulation, a properly filed renewal application can automatically extend the document’s validity for up to 180 days.

When the lawsuit was filed, none of the renewal applications had been granted. Four plaintiffs’ 180-day extensions had expired, and the fifth plaintiff’s extension was set to expire shortly after filing. The plaintiffs alleged that the delays caused or would cause irreparable harm.

The plaintiffs asserted claims under the Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought a declaration that the delays were unreasonable and an order requiring U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to decide the renewal applications within the 180-day extension period. They also sought to proceed on behalf of a proposed class.

Preliminary Injunction

The plaintiffs asked for a preliminary injunction requiring the agency to decide renewal applications within the 180-day extension period. For applicants whose extensions had already expired, they sought decisions within 14 days after an injunction issued.

Before the hearing, the agency had decided the applications of Tony N., Jack S., and Heghine Muradyan. The court therefore denied the injunction motion as moot as to those three plaintiffs because they had received the relief they sought. The court also found that an exception for issues capable of recurring while escaping review did not apply, in part because their newly issued employment authorization documents would remain valid for 30 months.

The applications of Karen M. and Dayana Vera de Aponte remained pending. The court evaluated their request under the six factors used for alleged unreasonable government delay. Because the requested injunction would require the agency to act by a deadline not otherwise imposed by statute or regulation, the court required a clear likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed.

The court found that the delay for these two plaintiffs was slightly more than one month. It considered the agency’s explanation that the COVID-19 pandemic had caused appointment closures and backlogs, reduced receipts and fees had contributed to staffing shortages, and a sharp increase in asylum-related employment authorization applications had required the agency to reorganize and reprioritize resources. The court concluded that this factor weighed against an injunction.

The court also found that no statute or congressional declaration established a mandatory timetable for deciding these renewal applications. It concluded that the statutory provision cited by the plaintiffs was not mandatory and did not cover employment authorization documents. This factor also weighed against an injunction.

The court found that the plaintiffs’ interests favored relief because they faced economic harm and identified possible effects involving disability leave, a Medicaid provider number, and health insurance. But the court found that requiring decisions within 14 days could move the plaintiffs ahead of other applicants without producing a net gain. That factor weighed against relief. The court also found no showing that the agency intentionally delayed the applications or acted negligently; the sixth factor therefore weighed against relief or was neutral.

Overall, the court found that the most important factor, the second factor, and the fourth factor weighed against an injunction, while the third and fifth factors together favored one. The plaintiffs therefore had not shown a clear likelihood of success. The court did not address the remaining preliminary-injunction requirements and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.

Class Certification

The plaintiffs also sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which permits a class action when one injunction or declaration would provide relief to the entire class at once.

The court concluded that deciding whether an applicant deserved an injunction required balancing the delay-related factors, including harm and prejudice, on an individual basis. Because those individual evaluations would be necessary, a single classwide injunction would not provide the appropriate relief to every proposed class member at once. The court denied the motion for class certification.

Disposition

The court denied the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and the Motion for Class Certification. Judge Maxine M. Chesney signed the order.