J.P. v. Saul

Background

J.P. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his claim for Social Security disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. He alleged disability based on anxiety, panic disorder, depression, lower-back pain, sleep apnea, chronic fatigue, chronic prostatitis, and acid reflux.

After an earlier remand for further proceedings, an administrative law judge (ALJ) held another hearing on February 4, 2020. The ALJ found that J.P. had severe anxiety, depressive, personality, spine, obesity, and urinary-tract impairments. The ALJ determined that J.P. had the residual functional capacity (RFC)—his maximum ability to work despite his impairments—to perform less than the full range of light work, with physical and social restrictions. The ALJ found that J.P. could not perform his past work but could perform jobs such as marker, housekeeping cleaner, and routing clerk, and therefore concluded that he was not disabled.

Both sides moved for summary judgment, asking the court to decide the case based on the administrative record without a trial.

Medical-Opinion Evidence

J.P. argued that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of Natasha Krikorian, Psy.D., an examining psychologist, while giving greater weight to the opinions of Dr. Martin and state non-examining medical consultants. Krikorian diagnosed anxiety disorder, agoraphobia, and depressive disorder. She found moderate-to-marked impairments in adapting to work stress and changes, maintaining regular attendance, performing scheduled activities, and completing a normal workday or workweek without psychiatric interruptions.

The court held that the ALJ did not provide legally adequate reasons for discounting Krikorian’s opinion. The ALJ relied on the fact that Krikorian examined J.P. after his date last insured and claimed that her written report conflicted with a checkbox form. The court found that the examination’s later date, standing alone, was not a valid reason to reduce its weight, particularly because Krikorian reviewed earlier psychiatric records. The court also found that the written report and checkbox form were not inconsistent because the form did not ask about several subjects discussed in the report, including adaptability, attendance, and completing a workday without psychiatric interruptions.

J.P.’s Testimony

J.P. argued that the ALJ failed to give clear reasons for rejecting his testimony about the severity of his symptoms. The court found that the ALJ reasonably identified some inconsistencies involving memory, fatigue, treatment, and reports of improvement. But the court held that the ALJ failed to provide specific reasons for discounting J.P.’s testimony about agoraphobia.

The court explained that the ALJ tried to address agoraphobia by limiting J.P. to occasional interaction with coworkers and the public. But J.P. testified that his agoraphobia was connected to maintaining a work schedule, not simply to interacting with other people. Because the ALJ had also improperly discounted medical opinions diagnosing agoraphobia, the court found that the ALJ had not adequately evaluated this part of J.P.’s testimony.

Step-Three Listing Analysis

J.P. also argued that the ALJ improperly found that he did not meet the paragraph C requirements for Listing 12.06, which concerns anxiety disorders. The court held that the ALJ provided evidence supporting the paragraph B findings but gave only conclusory remarks about paragraph C.

The court noted that the record documented severe anxiety over at least two years, treatment with Zoloft, mental-health therapy, support from J.P.’s mother, and evidence from Krikorian of marked impairment in completing a normal workday or workweek without psychiatric interruptions. Because the ALJ did not adequately explain the paragraph C determination, the court could not assess whether substantial evidence supported it.

Disposition

The court granted J.P.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. The court chose further proceedings rather than a direct award of benefits because the defects in the administrative decision could be addressed through additional administrative proceedings. Judge Laurel Beeler did not decide that J.P. was entitled to benefits; the order required the agency to reconsider the issues identified by the court.