Wynn v. Foulk
- Susan Illston
- 3:20-cv-00181
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 7
In Wynn v. Foulk, Judge Illston denied Wynn’s habeas petition, finding the state court reasonably rejected his ineffective-assistance claim involving racial-profile testimony.
Samuel Wynn was denied federal relief from his California convictions and sentence. The state-court judgment remains in place, and the federal court ordered the file closed.
What happened
In Wynn v. Foulk, Samuel Wynn asked the federal court to overturn his state conviction, arguing that his trial lawyer should have objected to testimony he said improperly relied on race. Judge Illston denied the petition.
A jury had convicted Wynn of human trafficking for commercial sex and simple kidnapping after evidence that he forced a woman into a car. The California Court of Appeal found that any error involving the testimony was harmless because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Wynn argued that this decision unreasonably applied the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Judge Illston ruled that Wynn had not met the demanding federal standard for overturning a state-court decision. She found that the testimony was unlikely to have meaningfully affected the verdict given Wynn’s statements, the forced removal, and eyewitness evidence. She also explained that this federal proceeding could not provide relief based only on a California statute.
The detailed version
- Wynn v. Foulk · No. 3:20-cv-00181
- Susan Illston
- Dec. 29, 2021
Background
Samuel Wynn, through counsel, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his California conviction. A jury found him guilty of human trafficking for commercial sex and simple kidnapping. The trial court sentenced him to 88 years to life in state prison.
The prosecution’s evidence included testimony from the woman Wynn was accused of forcing into a Lexus, a nearby witness who called police, and an Oakland police officer who testified as an expert about commercial sexual exploitation and “Guerilla Pimping.” The officer also gave testimony about racial patterns and practices that Wynn argued was racial profiling. Wynn’s trial lawyer did not object to that testimony or to the prosecution’s later reliance on it.
The California Court of Appeal held that any assumed error in admitting the testimony was harmless because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. It also concluded that there was sufficient evidence of Wynn’s intent to force the woman into commercial sex. The California Supreme Court denied review.
Claims and standard of review
Wynn argued that the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington when it concluded that his lawyer’s failure to object did not prejudice him. Under Strickland, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance must show both deficient legal performance and a reasonable probability that the result would have been different without the lawyer’s errors.
Because the state court had decided the claim on the merits, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 limited federal relief. Under that law, the federal court could grant relief only if the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law, or rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court emphasized that an incorrect decision is not enough; the state court’s ruling must be beyond reasonable disagreement among fair-minded judges.
Court’s analysis
The court held that Wynn had not met this demanding standard. It pointed to Wynn’s statement that he was a pimp, his conduct in violently forcing the woman into the vehicle, his statements indicating an intent to force her into commercial sex, and the eyewitness accounts describing the nonconsensual encounter.
The court acknowledged that the racial-profile testimony might have been problematic, but concluded that it was unlikely to have contributed to the verdict in any meaningful way. The California Court of Appeal’s decision therefore was not so unjustified that federal habeas relief was warranted.
Wynn also sought relief under California Penal Code section 745, part of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. The court explained that a federal petition under § 2254 authorizes review of violations of federal law, not claims based on state statutory law. It therefore did not grant relief on that basis.
Disposition
The court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the clerk to close the file.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.