Dugar v. Pak "N" Save Store 3111
- Jacquelyn Corley
- 3:21-cv-08904
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 5
In Dugar v. Pak “N” Save, Judge Corley found the complaint deficient under Rule 8 and allowed Dugar to amend it.
Ernesto Dugar, whose complaint was found deficient under Rule 8 but who was allowed to amend it; Pak “N” Save Store #3111, which had not yet been required to respond.
What happened
In Dugar v. Pak “N” Save Store #3111, Ernesto Dugar alleged that the store hired him without telling him, falsely recorded him as working, and then terminated him for job abandonment. He brought claims for constructive discharge and wrongful termination, citing Title VII and California Labor Code section 2922.
The court said constructive discharge is not itself a claim for damages and that Dugar did not allege the facts needed for one. It also found that he did not identify a public policy violated by the termination or facts suggesting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The complaint therefore did not give the store adequate notice of the claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
Judge Jacquelyn Scott Corley issued a screening order allowing Dugar to file an amended complaint by February 11, 2022. The court warned that failure to correct the deficiencies could lead to a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed, and vacated the scheduled case-management conference.
The detailed version
- Dugar v. Pak "N" Save Store 3111 · No. 3:21-cv-08904
- Jacquelyn Corley
- Jan. 11, 2022
Background
The court had previously allowed Ernesto Dugar to proceed without paying the filing fee. It then reviewed his complaint before service under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Dugar was not represented by a lawyer.
Dugar alleged that he went to the defendant’s store in May 2021 to apply for a night-stocker position. After an interview, he gave the manager his email address and phone number but never heard back. In August 2021, he received a check and a letter stating that he had been terminated for “Job Abandonment.” The letter said he had clocked in on June 28, 2021, but failed to appear on June 29, June 30, or July 1. Dugar alleged that the defendant had told another employee to clock him in or had otherwise recorded him as clocking in without his knowledge. He said he did not know he had been hired until receiving the termination letter and that he was currently homeless.
Dugar asserted claims for “constructive dismissal” and “wrongful [] termination,” citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California Labor Code section 2922.
Court’s analysis
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss an unrepresented plaintiff’s complaint before service if it is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or has a complete defense apparent on its face. The court also explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a short and plain statement giving the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds supporting it.
Constructive discharge. The court explained that constructive discharge is a legal doctrine that treats an apparent resignation as a firing; standing alone, it is not a tort or breach-of-contract claim. Dugar did not allege an express or implied agreement for employment for a particular period. He also alleged that the defendant terminated him before he knew he had been hired, rather than alleging that the defendant’s conduct forced him to resign. The court therefore concluded that the constructive-discharge claim did not entitle him to relief.
Wrongful termination. The court identified the elements of a California wrongful-termination claim as employment by the defendant, discharge, a public-policy violation motivating the discharge, and resulting harm. Dugar did not identify a public policy violated by the alleged termination. The court said California Labor Code section 2922, which concerns employment terminable at will unless the parties agree otherwise, did not identify such a public policy on the facts alleged. The court also said that although Title VII expresses a policy against discrimination, Dugar had not alleged facts sufficient to infer that his termination violated that policy. The court concluded that this claim did not comply with Rule 8.
Title VII. The court described the basic requirements for a discrimination claim under Title VII, including membership in a protected class, qualification for the position, an adverse employment action, and facts showing more favorable treatment of similarly situated people outside the protected class or other circumstances suggesting discrimination. Title VII covers discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Dugar did not identify a protected class or other circumstances suggesting discrimination on one of those bases. The court also noted that he did not allege facts showing that he knew the defendant had hired him. The court concluded that the complaint did not provide fair notice of the Title VII claim or its supporting grounds.
Disposition
The court found that the complaint, as pleaded, did not comply with Rule 8. It gave Dugar permission to file an amended complaint by February 11, 2022, with each claim in a separate numbered paragraph and each supporting factual allegation identified. The amended complaint had to be complete by itself and would replace the earlier complaint. The court warned that failure to follow the federal rules, local rules, or the court’s order, or failure to cure the identified deficiencies, could result in a report and recommendation that the complaint be dismissed. The court also vacated the February 17, 2022 case-management conference.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.