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N.D. Cal.Substantive rulingFiled Jan. 27, 2022

McCright v. Broomfield

Judge
Charles Breyer
Docket
3:21-cv-08802
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
4
HabeasSentencing
In one sentence

In McCright v. Broomfield, Judge Breyer dismissed the parole challenge, denied a certificate of appealability, and granted permission to proceed without fees.

Who this affects

Colvin McCright’s challenge to the California Board of Parole Hearings’ parole-suitability decision was dismissed; his request to proceed without paying the filing fee was granted, while a certificate of appealability was denied.

What happened

Colvin McCright, a state prisoner, challenged a parole decision that found him unsuitable for parole for three years. He argued that using California’s newer parole guidelines violated the constitutional ban on laws that unfairly apply new disadvantages to earlier conduct.

The court rejected that argument. It relied on a Ninth Circuit decision holding that the newer and older guidelines consider the same factors and that applying the newer guidelines does not disadvantage prisoners sentenced under the older system. The court also found that McCright had not supported his claim about a 1975 settlement agreement and that the state court’s interpretation of state law defeated his argument.

Judge Charles R. Breyer dismissed the habeas petition, denied a certificate of appealability, and granted McCright’s request to proceed without paying filing fees based on his affidavit of poverty.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
McCright v. Broomfield · No. 3:21-cv-08802
Judge
Charles Breyer
Date
Jan. 27, 2022

Background

Colvin McCright, a state prisoner at San Quentin State Prison, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the California Board of Parole Hearings’ September 16, 2020 decision finding him unsuitable for parole for three years. He also asked to proceed without paying the filing fee based on financial hardship.

McCright was convicted of first-degree murder in 1972 and received a sentence of seven years to life under California’s Indeterminate Sentencing Law. California repealed that law in 1977 and enacted the Determinate Sentencing Law, which uses a two-stage parole process: the prisoner must first be found suitable for parole, and then a release date is set.

Claim and Analysis

McCright argued that considering him under the newer law’s parole-suitability guidelines, rather than the older law’s guidelines, violated the federal constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. He also relied on what he described as a 1975 state-court settlement agreement that supposedly required the state to set an eight-to-thirteen-year maximum term and release him after that term even if he was not found suitable for parole.

The court explained that McCright had raised similar arguments in an earlier petition challenging a prior parole decision. In that earlier proceeding, the court concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed the claims. That precedent held that the newer guidelines require consideration of the same types of factors as the older guidelines, including the offense, age, habits, mental state, character, ability to reform, risk of reoffending, and rehabilitation in prison. Because applying the newer guidelines does not disadvantage prisoners sentenced under the older system, the precedent held that the practice violates neither the ex post facto prohibition nor federal due-process or equal-protection rights.

The court also rejected McCright’s argument concerning the alleged 1975 settlement agreement. He provided no proof of the agreement. The state superior court had found that he provided no documentary evidence and had misstated state law, explaining that even the rules in effect when he was sentenced did not give him a fixed prison term before a finding of parole suitability. The federal court stated that the state court’s interpretation of state law was binding on it and concluded that the Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed McCright’s ex post facto claim.

Disposition

The court held that the state courts’ rejection of McCright’s claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It dismissed the habeas petition.

The court denied a certificate of appealability because reasonable judges could not debate whether the court’s assessment of the constitutional claims was wrong. Separately, the court granted McCright’s motion to proceed without paying the filing fee, relying on his affidavit of poverty.

The authoritative version

Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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