DiMercurio v. Equilon Enterprises LLC

Background

The court had previously granted the plaintiffs’ class-certification motion in part on three of four claims. It allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint with additional allegations concerning the remaining claim for waiting-time penalties and then considered the parties’ supplemental briefs on that claim.

The amended complaint alleged that employees at Equilon Enterprises LLC’s refinery, doing business as Shell Oil Products US, were not timely paid all wages owed when their employment ended. California Labor Code sections 201 and 202 set deadlines for paying wages after a discharge or resignation. Section 203 provides a penalty of up to 30 days of wages when an employer willfully fails to pay those wages on time.

The plaintiffs proposed two subclasses. The 2016–2019 subclass covered class members separated from employment at the Martinez, California, refinery from June 4, 2016, through June 3, 2019, who did not timely receive all wages owed as a result of reporting obligations. The 2019–2020 subclass covered qualifying separations from June 4, 2019, through January 31, 2020.

Standing

The court held that all four named plaintiffs had constitutional standing, meaning they alleged the type of concrete financial injury required to bring the claim. Plaintiff Malcolm Synigal allegedly resigned, while Marco DiMercurio, John Langlitz, and Charles Gaeth allegedly were discharged. Each alleged that the defendant failed to pay all wages earned and unpaid when employment ended.

The defendant argued that the plaintiffs had released their waiting-time-penalty claims in a settlement and therefore had no legally recoverable injury. The court rejected that argument at the standing stage, explaining that whether the plaintiffs could legally recover was a merits issue rather than a question of whether they had alleged a concrete injury.

Class-certification requirements

The court explained that class certification asks whether the named plaintiffs can adequately represent people with similar claims. It held that the claim arose under section 203, which applies to employees who were discharged or who quit. Sections 201 and 202 establish when wages are due, but section 203 creates the claim for penalties.

The court concluded that the relevant injury was the failure to receive wages on time, not the particular way employment ended. Because discharged employees and employees who resigned allegedly suffered the same type of financial injury, the named plaintiffs’ claims did not raise significantly different concerns from those of the proposed class members. The court therefore found the requirements concerning typicality and adequacy of representation satisfied.

The court also found that common questions predominated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The central common question was whether the defendant’s standby system was lawful. Although determining when individual employees were discharged or resigned could require individualized evidence, the court treated that issue as related primarily to damages and not enough to defeat class treatment. The court also relied on its earlier conclusion that a class action was superior to individual litigation.

Disposition

The court GRANTED the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification on the waiting-time-penalties claim. Together with its earlier order, the court certified the two waiting-time-penalties subclasses covering the periods stated above. It also appointed Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld A.P.C. and Leonard Carder LLP as class counsel. The order certified the claim for class treatment; it did not decide whether the defendant ultimately violated the wage laws or what damages, if any, were owed.