Ramachandran v. City of Los Altos

Background

The court resolved defendants’ ten motions in limine, which are pretrial requests to limit evidence or arguments at trial. The remaining claims were First Amendment retaliation claims based on the filing and prosecution of the complaint in this action. The opinion states that the court had previously granted summary judgment for defendants on the plaintiff’s equal protection claims.

Rulings on the Motions

1. Racial discrimination or disparate treatment — granted. The plaintiff could present and discuss the complaint as the protected activity underlying his retaliation claims. He could not present evidence or argument supporting the complaint’s discrimination allegations, his equal protection claims, or the alleged history of complaints about disparate treatment. The court also declined to reconsider its earlier ruling that a continuing-violations theory did not apply to the retaliation claims.

2. Evidence concerning contractor Adam Conchas — granted. The plaintiff could not present evidence about hiring Conchas to obtain permits for home renovations in 2013, or about Conchas allegedly defrauding him and being disciplined by the State Licensing Board. The court stated that Conchas’s character, motivations, and conduct, as well as the plaintiff’s intentions in hiring him, were not at issue. The court noted that the parties appeared to agree that Conchas’s complaint to the City triggered the investigation of the plaintiff’s property improvements.

3. Damages incurred before September 1, 2018 — granted. The plaintiff could not present evidence of damages allegedly caused by retaliation before September 1, 2018. The court reasoned that the plaintiff identified the execution of an inspection-warrant application on that date as the first retaliatory act.

4. Lost rental income and diminished property value — granted in part and denied in part. If the plaintiff contended that he had a permit for a structure that could legally be inhabited as a dwelling, he could offer that evidence in support of damages for lost rent or reduced property value allegedly caused by the retaliation. He could not argue that he lacked a permit because City employees or others misled him in 2013 and 2014. The court did not decide whether an administrative hearing decision was admissible and stated that further briefing would be required if defendants sought to offer it.

5. Evidence predating February 25, 2016 — granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff could not present evidence of retaliatory motive attributable to people other than defendants Ballard and Jordan. He could present older evidence supporting his allegations about Ballard’s or Jordan’s motive, but that evidence had to remain tied to those defendants and the alleged retaliation. It could not include unrelated motives or racial-discrimination evidence.

6. Scheme or conspiracy evidence — granted. The plaintiff could not present evidence supporting a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim or an alleged scheme to defraud, because he had not pleaded those claims and the court had previously rejected his attempt to do so. The court also barred use of terms such as “conspiracy,” “scheme,” and “defraud,” or similar language, to describe defendants’ conduct or the plaintiff’s theory because those terms could confuse or mislead the jury.

7. Other property owners’ compliance with the municipal code — granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff could offer evidence about defendants’ pattern or practice concerning similarly situated properties or homeowners if it was relevant to Ballard’s or Jordan’s alleged retaliatory motive. He could not offer racial-discrimination or disparate-treatment evidence. He also could not offer evidence about the alleged illegality of the accessory structure on the Jacobses’ property, the propriety of the City’s permit to them, or damages from their property improvements.

8. Retaliatory intent by non-parties, including police officers — granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff could present evidence of alleged retaliatory acts, including an officer’s observation of his residence, citation for removing a posted “notice to vacate,” later prosecution, and statements made by the officer at the time. But evidence of other people’s motives was not relevant unless the plaintiff could show a plausible connection to Ballard’s or Jordan’s motives. Before presenting such evidence, he had to make an offer of proof outside the jury’s presence.

9. Argument that individual defendants were terminated — granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff could ask about the circumstances of Ballard’s, Jordan’s, or Kornfield’s departure from City employment. He could not question witnesses in a way that unfairly suggested or implied that their employment had been terminated because of his retaliation allegations, particularly when he apparently lacked a basis for that assertion.

10. Lay testimony about emotional distress — granted. The plaintiff and other lay witnesses could testify about their observations of his physical or mental symptoms and when those symptoms began. They could not testify that the alleged retaliation caused particular symptoms or provide medical diagnoses.

Disposition and Effect

The order resolved defendants’ motions in limine as follows: Motions 1, 2, 3, 6, and 10 were granted; Motions 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 were granted in part and denied in part. The order controlled what evidence and arguments could be presented at trial; it did not decide the ultimate merits of the remaining retaliation claims.