Reynolds v. Google LLC

Background

Larry Reynolds, a musician from Louisiana who performs under the stage name L.P. Reynolds, sued Google LLC under the Copyright Act. He alleged that Google made approximately 70 of his songs available for streaming and downloading without authorization. The complaint identified several copyrighted albums and alleged that Google had not filed a Notice of Intent with Reynolds or the Copyright Office and had not paid, or had underpaid, royalties. Reynolds acknowledged receiving some royalty payments from Google’s distribution of his works.

Google moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence shows there is no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

Court’s analysis

To prove copyright infringement, Reynolds had to show ownership of a valid copyright and copying of original elements of the work. The court explained that a license is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement. It also explained that distributing a song involves separate copyrights in the musical composition and the sound recording, and that a distributor must obtain a license for each to distribute the recording lawfully.

The court found that Google submitted uncontroverted evidence of both types of licenses. Through CD Baby, Google obtained licenses for Reynolds’s sound recordings. Evidence showed that Reynolds authorized CD Baby to license and distribute works he submitted, that the licenses were active whenever his works were streamed or downloaded through Google Play Music, and that CD Baby paid Reynolds the royalties due for Google’s use. The court found no genuine dispute about the validity or duration of those sound-recording licenses.

Google obtained mechanical licenses for the musical compositions through the Harry Fox Agency. The evidence showed that Reynolds, acting for his publisher, L.P. Reynolds Music and Film, accepted Google’s licensing agreement through the Harry Fox Agency’s electronic process in 2014 and again in 2016. When given an opportunity to opt out in 2018, he did not do so. Google paid royalties to the Harry Fox Agency, which distributed them to publishers, and Reynolds’s complaint acknowledged receiving royalties from that agency. The court found no genuine dispute about the validity or duration of the mechanical licenses.

Reynolds argued that Google’s evidence was untrue, but he offered no evidence supporting that assertion. His opposition included only printouts of federal statutes. The court also noted that he had not participated in discovery, produced documents, responded to requests for production or admission, or appeared for his deposition.

The court rejected Reynolds’s argument that the licenses were invalid because he had not provided handwritten signatures. Reynolds did not support that argument, and the court cited federal law providing that an electronic signature generally cannot be denied legal effect solely because it is electronic.

The court also held that Reynolds had the burden to show Google exceeded the licenses’ scope because the existence of the licenses was not disputed. Reynolds provided no facts establishing that Google exceeded their scope. Finally, the court held that a Notice of Intent is required for a compulsory license, but Google had negotiated licenses, so the notice was not required.

Disposition

The court granted Google’s motion for summary judgment. It did not identify any genuine dispute of material fact that would support Reynolds’s infringement claim, and it entered the ruling because Reynolds had not provided evidence opposing Google’s motion. The opinion does not state that the case was dismissed or specify a prejudice designation.