Ein G. v. Kijakazi
- Jacquelyn Corley
- 3:20-cv-06713
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 4
In Ein G. v. Kijakazi, Judge Corley denied Ein G.’s motion to change the judgment upholding the disability-benefits denial.
Ein G.’s request to change the prior judgment was denied, leaving the judgment denying disability benefits and granting the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment in place.
What happened
In Ein G. v. Kijakazi, the court had previously denied Ein G.’s request for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, finding enough evidence supported the administrative law judge’s decision that Ein G. was not disabled. Ein G. asked the court to change that judgment.
Ein G. argued that the vocational expert’s estimates of available jobs were based on unreliable data and that the court had made a clear mistake by accepting them. The court said these arguments repeated issues already raised and rejected, and that Ein G. could have questioned the vocational expert about the expert’s methods before judgment was entered.
The court concluded that the vocational expert’s testimony could support the disability decision even without additional supporting data and denied the motion to alter or amend the judgment. Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley signed the order.
The detailed version
- Ein G. v. Kijakazi · No. 3:20-cv-06713
- Jacquelyn Corley
- Feb. 1, 2022
Background
Ein G. sought Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income based on physical impairments including a herniated disc, arthritis, and a hernia. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Ein G. asked the court to review an administrative law judge’s final decision finding Ein G. not disabled.
On December 6, 2021, the court denied Ein G.’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that substantial evidence—enough relevant evidence that a reasonable decision-maker could rely on—supported the administrative law judge’s step-five finding that Ein G. was not disabled.
Motion to Alter or Amend
Ein G. then filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) asking the court to alter or amend the judgment. Ein G. argued that the court had committed a manifest error by accepting the vocational expert’s job-number estimates. In particular, Ein G. contended that the vocational expert had relied on job numbers for an entire occupational category rather than its subcategories, possibly using an equal-distribution method that Ein G. described as widely discredited.
The court rejected the motion. It found that Ein G.’s arguments were a recasting of arguments previously considered and rejected. In the earlier summary-judgment briefing, Ein G. had speculated that the vocational expert could have calculated the numbers only through the equal-distribution method. The court had rejected that argument because it was speculation and because other explanations were possible, including reliance on the expert’s labor-market experience.
The court also rejected Ein G.’s new argument that the expert’s testimony showed reliance only on a particular publication. The court noted that Ein G. had not questioned the expert about the publication or whether the expert also relied on personal labor-market experience. The court said nothing prevented Ein G. from asking those questions before judgment was entered.
Ruling
The court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent stating that a vocational expert’s recognized expertise can provide the foundation for the expert’s testimony and that additional foundation is not required. It also cited the Supreme Court’s statement that vocational-expert testimony may constitute substantial evidence even when it is not accompanied by supporting data.
The court DENIED Ein G.’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. The order states that it disposes of Docket No. 25.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.