Knuth v. Resch
- Thomas Hixson
- 3:22-cv-00338
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 5
In Knuth v. Resch, Judge Hixson dismissed the negligence-per-se claim without leave to amend but allowed the emotional-distress claim to proceed.
Kerry Knuth and Martin Resch; the ruling dismissed Knuth’s negligence-per-se claim without leave to amend and allowed her IIED claim to proceed.
What happened
In Knuth v. Resch, Kerry Knuth sued her ex-husband, Martin Resch, for damages allegedly resulting from his transmission of human papillomavirus, which she says caused anal cancer.
Resch asked the court to dismiss Knuth’s negligence-per-se and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims. The court dismissed the negligence-per-se claim without leave to amend, but found that Knuth had alleged enough facts for the emotional-distress claim to continue.
Judge Hixson granted in part and denied in part Resch’s motion to dismiss. The ordinary-negligence claim was not affected by this ruling.
The detailed version
- Knuth v. Resch · No. 3:22-cv-00338
- Thomas Hixson
- Feb. 16, 2022
Background
Kerry Knuth sued Martin Resch, her ex-husband, for damages arising from the alleged transmission of a sexually transmitted disease. Knuth alleged that during their marriage, Resch represented that he was disease-free and insisted on unprotected sexual intercourse. She alleged that Resch had unprotected sex with several other women, became infected with human papillomavirus (HPV), transmitted HPV to her, and caused her to develop anal cancer.
Knuth originally asserted five causes of action: negligence, negligence per se, sexual battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and false promise. Resch removed the case from state court based on diversity of citizenship. He moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to support a legally valid claim, to dismiss the negligence-per-se and IIED claims.
Negligence Per Se
Knuth based her negligence-per-se claim on California Health and Safety Code section 120290, which prohibits the willful transmission of an infectious disease. Resch argued that Knuth had not alleged that he specifically intended to transmit HPV to her. Knuth stated that she did not oppose dismissal of this claim and that dismissal would not affect her ordinary-negligence claim.
The court granted Resch’s motion as to the negligence-per-se claim. In its conclusion, the court dismissed that claim without leave to amend.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To plead IIED under California law, Knuth had to allege extreme and outrageous conduct, an intent to cause—or reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing—emotional distress, severe emotional distress, and causation.
Resch argued that Knuth had not provided enough detail about her cancer diagnosis, treatment, emotional distress, its effects on her, or its severity. The court rejected that argument at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Accepting Knuth’s allegations as true and viewing them favorably to her, the court found it plausible that Resch’s alleged concealment of his condition, sexual relationship with Knuth, and transmission of HPV could cause extreme emotional distress. The IIED claim therefore survived the motion to dismiss.
Disposition
The court granted in part and denied in part Resch’s motion to dismiss. Knuth’s negligence-per-se claim was dismissed without leave to amend, while her IIED claim survived. The opinion states that the ruling did not affect the ordinary-negligence claim.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.