The Women's Student Union v. U.S. Department of Education
- Edward Chen
- 3:21-cv-01626
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 20
In The Women’s Student Union v. U.S. Department of Education, Judge Chen dismissed the amended complaint for lack of standing and denied intervention motions as moot.
The Women’s Student Union’s case was dismissed for lack of standing, but it was allowed to file a second amended complaint within 30 days. The Department of Education prevailed on its jurisdictional motion. The proposed intervenors’ motions were denied as moot and without prejudice, allowing them to refile if WSU filed another amended complaint.
What happened
The Women’s Student Union challenged 2020 Department of Education regulations that narrowed federal administrative protections against sexual harassment and sexual violence under Title IX. It claimed the regulations violated the Administrative Procedure Act and Title IX, and argued that the regulations prevented it from triggering investigations of complaints involving students at Berkeley High School.
The court ruled that the Union did not show the kind of procedural injury needed for standing to sue in federal court. The regulation did not guarantee an investigation whenever someone filed a complaint; an investigation was required only when the Department determined that information indicated a possible violation. The court also noted that the Department had opened an investigation into the Union’s complaint, and that the Union’s request to set aside the regulations challenged their substance rather than a failure to follow required procedures.
Judge Edward M. Chen granted the Department’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Union had not established standing. The court dismissed the amended complaint with leave to amend, allowing a second amended complaint within 30 days, and denied the proposed intervenors’ motions as moot and without prejudice.
The detailed version
- The Women's Student Union v. U.S. Department of Education · No. 3:21-cv-01626
- Edward Chen
- Feb. 16, 2022
Background
The Women’s Student Union (WSU), an approved student body association of the Berkeley Unified School District, sued the U.S. Department of Education under the Administrative Procedure Act. WSU sought to set aside 2020 Title IX regulations that, according to WSU, reduced federal protections for students in public schools from sexual harassment and sexual violence.
WSU alleged that the regulations narrowed the Department’s administrative enforcement of Title IX by limiting the types of harassment that required a school response, restricting the relevant locations of harassment, requiring actual knowledge by a school employee, and applying a deliberate-indifference standard. WSU alleged that members experienced sexual harassment and that the Berkeley Unified School District had failed to respond adequately. It also alleged that, because of the 2020 regulations, some complaints could no longer trigger investigations by the Department’s Office for Civil Rights.
The court had previously dismissed WSU’s original complaint for failing to adequately allege organizational or associational standing, but allowed WSU to amend. WSU filed a First Amended Complaint. The Department then moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The State of Texas and three groups separately moved to intervene as defendants.
Standing and Procedural Injury
Article III standing requires a plaintiff to show an injury in fact, a connection between that injury and the defendant’s conduct, and a likelihood that a favorable court decision would remedy the injury. WSU did not rely on the organizational-standing theory it had previously asserted. Instead, it argued that it had standing because the regulations deprived WSU and its members of a procedural right to trigger Department investigations.
The court rejected that theory. A procedural injury for standing purposes requires an alleged violation of a statute or regulation that guarantees a particular procedure, that protects a concrete interest, and that presents a reasonable probability of threatening that interest. The court held that 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c) did not guarantee an investigation whenever a complaint was filed. The Department had to investigate when information indicated a possible failure to comply with the relevant requirements, but submitting a complaint alone did not entitle the complainant to an investigation.
The court distinguished a procedural right from a challenge to substantive law. WSU was not challenging the Department’s procedures for processing complaints. Instead, its theory depended on the claim that the 2020 regulations unlawfully changed the substantive definitions and standards governing Title IX violations. The relief WSU requested—setting aside and enjoining the 2020 regulations—would change the substantive rules, rather than require the Department to follow a particular procedure.
The court also relied on events after the First Amended Complaint was filed. The Office for Civil Rights had opened an investigation into WSU’s complaint. The court found that the Department’s letters did not show that it had rejected any part of the complaint or declined to investigate particular allegations. WSU’s assertion that future complaints might not be investigated was speculative because the regulations did not prohibit the Department from investigating future complaints.
Leave to Amend and Intervention Motions
Although the court found WSU’s procedural-injury theory insufficient, it could not conclude that amendment would necessarily be futile. The court therefore granted WSU leave to amend again to try to establish organizational or traditional associational standing by addressing the deficiencies identified in the earlier dismissal order.
Because the court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, it denied the proposed intervenors’ motions as moot. The court stated that the proposed intervenors could refile their motions if WSU filed a second amended complaint.
Disposition
The court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because WSU failed to establish standing. The First Amended Complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, and WSU could file a second amended complaint within 30 days. The court denied the motions to intervene as moot and without prejudice.
Read the full 20-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.