Rael v. Pantoja

Background

Joseph Rael, a California state prisoner, sued correctional officers Guerra and I. Perez-Pantoja under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute that permits certain civil-rights claims against government officials. He alleged excessive force and First Amendment retaliation. According to the complaint, Rael said on April 13, 2018, that he would submit a staff complaint against Guerra. Rael alleged that Perez-Pantoja later threatened to tell other inmates that Rael was a snitch, that defendants used excessive force against him, and that a false rules-violation report was issued in retaliation.

Defendants sought partial summary judgment on the ground that Rael had not exhausted the prison’s administrative appeals process for his First Amendment retaliation claim. They also sought judgment on the pleadings, an early motion asking the court to rule based on the pleadings, arguing that damages claims in the defendants’ official capacities were barred and that the request for declaratory relief should be dismissed.

Administrative exhaustion

The court explained that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to complete available administrative remedies before filing suits challenging prison conditions. During the relevant period, California’s correctional system used a three-level appeals process. A substantive decision at the third level completed that process.

Rael identified Grievance CTF-18-01511 as the only appeal he had exhausted concerning this action. That grievance primarily described the alleged excessive-force incident. Although it used the words “retaliatory” and “retaliatory ethical means,” it did not describe Rael’s statement that he would file a staff complaint, Perez-Pantoja’s alleged threat, or the alleged false rules-violation report. The court held that merely using the word “retaliation” did not adequately alert prison officials to the retaliation claim.

Rael also argued that he raised the false-report issue for the first time at the third level of review. The court ruled that this did not exhaust the claim because an inmate may not add new issues at the second or third level, and the reviewer had told Rael that the added issue needed to be raised in a separate appeal. The court rejected Rael’s argument that he lacked space on the form and his argument that he verbally discussed retaliation during an interview. It also concluded that Grievance CTF-18-03717, which concerned a November 2018 incident, would not have alerted prison officials to the alleged retaliation in April 2018.

The court found that defendants had shown an available administrative remedy that Rael failed to complete, and that Rael had not shown that the process was effectively unavailable to him. It therefore granted summary judgment to defendants on Rael’s failure to exhaust the First Amendment retaliation claim.

Official-capacity allegations and declaratory relief

Rael sought relief against the defendants in both their individual and official capacities. The court held that the allegations against them in their official capacities were barred because state officials acting in their official capacities are not treated as “persons” who can be sued under § 1983 in these circumstances. Those official-capacity allegations were dismissed.

Rael also sought a declaration that defendants violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that the First Amendment claim had been dismissed as unexhausted. It dismissed the request for declaratory relief concerning the Eighth Amendment claim because it duplicated Rael’s surviving § 1983 claim for damages and would not provide a separate useful remedy.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and for Judgment on the Pleadings. Rael’s First Amendment retaliation claim was dismissed without prejudice. The official-capacity allegations and the duplicative request for declaratory relief were dismissed. The opinion states that the remaining claim continued. The parties were referred to a random magistrate judge for an early settlement conference within 90 days or at the judge’s convenience.